The Keenest Sorrow: Failing Verification

Sophocles wrote, " The keenest sorrow is to recognize ourselves as the sole cause of all our adversities,” which probably applies to the Watanabe Group Companies of China in a recent antidumping determination by the U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC”).

DOC published in an October 18, 2010 Federal Register notice its preliminary results in Certain Lined Paper Products (“CLPP”) from the People’s Republic of China, for the third administrative review of that antidumping order. DOC imposed a 258.21% dumping rate on Watanabe, based on “adverse facts available,” because DOC believed that Watanabe submitted false documentation at verification.

DOC explained the reasons for the results as follows:

“…petitioner supplied invoices which they claimed correspond to invoices related to third-country sales reviewed at verification and provided as verification exhibits. Specifically, petitioner points to the similarity between the products listed, quantities and other details in the two sets of invoices. However, they note the significant differences in payment amounts between the two sets of invoices. Additionally, petitioner provided documentation demonstrating payment in the amount listed on the petitioner-provided invoice and receipt of that amount as recorded in Watanabe supplied payment documentation at Verification Exhibit 14 at page 1. For three of Watanabe's third-country sales, petitioner provided documentation demonstrating payment in the amount listed on the invoices petitioner provided and not those provided by Watanabe. This raises a fundamental question about the reliability of the documents reviewed at verification.”

“Regardless of the motives of either party, we preliminarily determine that petitioner has provided credible evidence of misreporting of sales values by Watanabe. The fact that the total revenue associated with the invoiced amounts petitioner submitted tied to the company book and records tends to show that the prices on the invoices reviewed at verification are incorrect, thus fundamentally calling into question the reliability of Watanabe's records.”

“To ensure that the margin is sufficiently adverse so as to induce cooperation, we have preliminarily assigned to the PRC-wide entity, including Watanabe, the rate of 258.21 percent, the highest rate on the record of this proceeding. This rate was assigned to the PRC-wide entity in the investigation of CLPP from the PRC.”


Background

An antidumping case was filed against Certain Lined Paper Products (“CLPP”) from the People’s Republic of China on September 9, 2006. Lined paper is used as school supplies, such as notebooks, composition books, loose leaf, filler paper, graph paper, and laboratory notebooks, for writing reports and doing homework. The Watanabe Group participated in the original investigation and received a margin of 134%.

In the First Administrative Review, DOC obtained Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) quantity and value data for the parties for which a review was requested. After assessing its resources, DOC determined that it could reasonably examine only one of the four exporters subject to the review.

On November 7, 2007, DOC selected Lian Li as a mandatory respondent, not the Watanabe Group. Lian Li succeeded in explaining its accounting system and reconciling most of its costs to its financial statement. As a result, Lian Li received an antidumping margin of 22.35%, which was shared by the Watanabe Group, dropping its margin from the 134% of the original investigation

In the Second Administrative Review, DOC determined that facts available with an adverse inference were warranted for Watanabe because Watanabe had submitted an incomplete response to DOC’s initial questionnaire. Watanabe had claimed that, because it did not sell subject merchandise to the United States during the period of review (“POR”), it would not respond to Sections A, C and D of the questionnaire. However, entries of its merchandise in fact had been made during the POR. Because Watanabe refused to supply the requested information and the record contradicted its representations, DOC assigned Watanabe a punitive facts available rate of 258.21 percent in its final results of the Second Administrative Review. Nonetheless, Watanabe still had a chance to turn its situation around, as it had sales during the period to be examined in the Third Administrative Review.

Verifying The Preliminary Results Of The Third Administrative Review

DOC conducted the Third Administrative Review for the period September 1, 2008, through August 31, 2009 with respect to four producers/exporters. This time, Watanabe was examined and everything seemed to be going well, until the petitioners submitted third country invoices (invoices the petitioner obtained from other buyers of the product), which caused DOC to doubt the accuracy of Watanabe’s records. As DOC reported in its Federal Register Notice of the preliminary results:

- Petitioner-submitted invoices appear to establish that the sales and payment values do not tie to Watanabe's own internal records.

-Watanabe argued the petitioner refers to third country sales, which it claims are irrelevant to the Department's inquiry into U.S. sales and the mere allegation that such third country sales were diverted to the United States is insufficient.

-Specifically, petitioner points to the similarity between the products listed, quantities and other details in the two sets of invoices. However, they note the significant differences in payment amounts between the two sets of invoices.

-For three of Watanabe's third-country sales, petitioner provided documentation demonstrating payment in the amount listed on the invoices that were not those provided by Watanabe. This raises a fundamental question about the reliability of the documents reviewed at verification.

-The fact that the total revenue associated with the invoiced amounts petitioner submitted tied to the company books and records tends to show that the prices on the invoices reviewed at verification are incorrect, thus fundamentally calling into question the reliability of Watanabe's records.


Hence, after the petitioners saw the verification exhibits and compared them to documents they had collected from third parties, they called conspicuous differences to DOC’s attention. They pointed out that verification documents that tied to the third party invoices agreed in total, but the quantities and prices did not. The Petitioners also pointed out that the payment amounts shown on the third country invoices did not match the amounts shown as being paid on those invoices in the accounting records that the respondent presented to DOC at verification.

For a company to improve its margin, it would need to prove higher U.S. sales prices for subject merchandise. In a period of review, the company would have to be selling, therefore, at higher prices than during a prior period. Companies trying to manipulate their records, without in fact making such sales, should expect to be caught and to face the consequences.

It seems that some companies have tried to manipulate their records by appearing to have prices for third country sales that are lower than U.S. sales prices by an equivalent amount (i.e., lowering the reported price on the third country sales by the same amount that they increase the price on the US sale, such that the total remains the same). The total then appears reconciled in the summary totals of the financial statements. Financial statements and invoices appear to reconcile; the antidumping margin falls. The exercise, however, is fraudulent, and the lawyers’ certifications are false. When petitioners present contrary third country prices, the perpetrating companies are caught.

For a successful verification, where DOC officials do not think they are being deceived, financial records must be reconcilable internally and with the answers respondent companies have provided in questionnaires. CLPP is not the first case in which a Chinese company failed in a cloud of distrust generated by inconsistencies exposed in their own documents, but with a growing DOC concern about Chinese respondents generally, it is surprising that Watanabe was apparently not at least more alert about its own records.

The most celebrated and very public example of verification failure involved Crawfish from the People’s Republic of China. DOC officials became suspicious of the documents offered at verification and went to the respondents’ preparation room (typically, respondents will make a well-organized presentation of documents in one room while sorting and assembling them in another) . Although the Crawfish respondent had told the DOC verifiers previously that “the company did not maintain computer records of customers of [sic] business transactions,” the officials found business documents on the computer in use in the preparation room. Following this discovery, things only got worse for the Chinese company. DOC concluded that the respondents were being deceptive and applied punitive adverse facts available, as they did in CLLP. The details of this episode are described in the Crawfish Verification Report.

The respondent Chinese company gave DOC the impression in Crawfish that something was “odd” at verification by its own actions, particularly claiming that computers were not used for maintaining business records while business transactions were found on company computers. In addition, the company’s “accountant” did not have a National “identity” card and apparently was an employee of another crawfish exporter who had been involved in a previous verification for that other company. If these dramatic and unexplained discrepancies were not enough, the electricity did not function during verification in the rooms where DOC was trying to access the company’s computer, leaving DOC officials with little choice but to believe that they were being deceived, as other DOC officials concluded in CLPP.

Trouble Of Watanabe’s Own Making, But In A More Challenging Legal Environment
In the past several months, a pattern has begun to emerge in which DOC has been applying, more often than in the past, “facts available,” and with adverse inferences, to respondents from China. The application of the rules seems to be changing. The DOC and petitioners are more and more suspicious that Chinese companies are falsifying records shown at verification and, therefore, are seeking to confirm the accuracy of those records whenever possible through outside sources. Some petitioners are using former FBI and Scotland Yard investigators to contact companies who supposedly are market economy suppliers of inputs to respondents in China, in order to discredit respondents’ claims of market prices.

CLPP is now one of several cases contributing to DOC’s apparently deep and growing mistrust of Chinese data. The Watanabe Group may, or may not, have been trying to deceive DOC, but in the presence of discrepant data, subsequent to misrepresentation in a previous review, and in a developing context of doubts about the veracity of Chinese verification presentations in other cases, the impression governed. The more Chinese companies rely on deception, or appear to be doing so, to get through verifications, the more they can expect to be exposed and find themselves with prohibitive results. Worried about the expense of legal defense, they are finding themselves having wasted both their money and their time because of an apparent lack of due diligence and care in preparing and hosting verifications. To prevail in trade disputes now, before an ever-more vigilant DOC and ever-more suspicious and skeptical petitioners, Chinese respondents will need to rely on facts they can verify, not fabrication or supposition, and they will need legal counsel with sterling reputations before U.S. agencies to avoid regrettable presumptions.

Winning At All Costs

Unfortunately, as the number of trade disputes has diminished, Chinese and U.S. legal counsel have been promising prospective Chinese clients the impossible, and then have done whatever it seems to take to achieve it. Some routinely promise zero margins in antidumping cases before they have seen company books, and base their fees largely on the contingency of such results. Some have represented more than one company, promising each one a better result than the other with both guaranteeing a fee bonus should it get the best result. One of the companies must lose, but the lawyers in such circumstances have to win.

There may not have been a lawyering issue in the CLPP case. The Watanabe Group’s experience may have arisen from simple misunderstandings. Nonetheless, DOC concluded, as manifested by the application of adverse facts available, that there was deception. When there may be doubt, DOC is now sending a signal that benefits of doubts will not be going to Chinese companies, and the troubles Chinese companies face may be all the more painful for being of their own making.
 

Should the United States Switch to a Prospective System for Assessing Antidumping and Countervailing Duties? - The Department of Commerce Reports to Congress

The U.S. Department of Commerce ("Commerce") reported to the U.S. Congress in November 2010 on the Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of Retrospective and Prospective Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Collection Systems. Commerce made no recommendations. It also is unlikely that Congress would have the appetite anytime soon to consider the wholesale revisions to U.S. trade laws that changing to a prospective duty assessment system would entail. Nevertheless, there are several noteworthy items in the report.

All other countries, unlike the United States, rely on prospective systems in their trade laws, as does the WTO. These systems require changes going forward, following an investigation and findings, but do not reach back for penalties. Congress instructed Commerce to address how prospective systems compare to the U.S. retrospective system on the following criteria:
(1) Remedying injurious dumped or subsidized imports;
(2) Minimizing uncollected duties;
(3) Reducing incentives to evade antidumping (“AD”) and countervailing duties (“CVD”);
(4) Targeting high risk importers;
(5) Considering the impact of retrospective rate increases on importers and their employees; and
(6) Minimizing administrative burdens.
Commerce received comments from 40 interested parties, including comments that the editors of this blog submitted on April 20, 2010. Those commentators represented a wide range of industries, petitioning U.S. producers, foreign producers, importers and customers. The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), which enforces AD and CVD orders at the ports, previously submitted comments for a study by the Government Accountability Office. Commerce summarizes some of those earlier agency comments in its report.

Commerce noted that the United States is the only country that uses a retrospective system for collecting AD and CVD duties. Advocates of keeping the retrospective system, mostly U.S. petitioners, emphasized the greater accuracy of the system because duties are assessed based on the amount of dumping or subsidization found for the actual imports in question. Commerce acknowledged that advocates of prospective systems argued that such claims of superior accuracy are not achieved consistently in practice because Commerce in recent years has not reviewed more than a couple of companies in administrative reviews, even when many companies requested reviews. Commerce has said it lacks the resources to review all the companies making requests. Commerce also noted the arguments of some commentators that retrospective duties are not very good at remedying the actual injury caused by dumping or subsidies because the duty rates cannot be known when importers and customers are making their pricing and purchasing decisions.

It appears from Commerce's Report that DHS would prefer a switch to a prospective system. Commerce quoted DHS as saying that "its preferred option would be 'for Congress to fundamentally alter the United States system by eliminating its retrospective component and make it prospective. This approach would …. [a]lleviate the collection issue faced by DHS due to substantial rate increases since the amount of duties assessed at entry would be the final amount owed.' "

Advocates of prospective systems emphasized that the retrospective system is bad for business, particularly small business, because it deprives companies of critical information on the full costs of their products before they have to make pricing decisions. Commerce responded to this criticism by pointing out that, because of due process rights in U.S. law, a prospective duty assessment system would not eliminate this uncertainty: the parties to AD and CVD proceedings have a due process right to appeal administrative determinations of Commerce and the United States International Trade Commission to the United States Court of International Trade and eventually to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The courts routinely enjoin liquidation of the customs entries for the duration of these proceedings. The final duty rates, which could go up as well as down as a result of court decisions, can take years to be known.

Commerce, thus, is correct in questioning the advantage of a prospective system, in light of U.S. legal rights, to achieve accuracy and predictability. The United States is famously a litigious society; trade cases often take many years to work their way through the Court of International Trade, through possible remands by the court back to the agencies (Commerce or the International Trade Commission), and possible further judicial review by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (with possible remands to the Court of International Trade).

Any party appealing an agency decision would want the court to enjoin the final assessment of antidumping or countervailing duties pending the appeal’s outcome. Otherwise, much of the economic benefit, should the party succeed in the appeal, would be lost. Because of separation of powers and due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution, Congress would not be able to strip the courts of the power to issue such injunctions through a change from a retrospective to a prospective system of duty assessment. Therefore, even were Congress to legislate such a change, the U.S. system would retain retrospective aspects. Under a prospective system, duties could be assessed and collected at the time of importation, but for any case on appeal -- for those companies whose shipments are the subject of the appeal, and with respect only to the issues under appeal -- the final duty owed would not be known until the court process would reach final decisions.

A prospective system may still be better. In many cases, the potential effect of a judicial reversal of Commerce’s determination can be quantified at the time of the appeal. Companies would be able to account for the risk of judicial reversal when making purchasing and pricing decisions. For example, if the only issue on appeal for a particular respondent were whether to allow a particular adjustment in the dumping calculation, the effect on the margin of allowing or disallowing that adjustment could be calculated at the time when the appeal would first be taken; importers could price their products accordingly. By contrast, under the current U.S. system, at the time of importation, when importers make their pricing decisions, most of the data necessary for a dumping calculation are unknown because Commerce has not yet performed any calculations, verification has not yet occurred, and a myriad of other variables remains undetermined. Thus, even for cases subject to judicial appeal, a prospective system provides more certainty than the current U.S. retrospective system.

Although a switch to a prospective system would not be the panacea that some proponents claim it would be, it would represent an improvement over the uniquely cumbersome U.S. system of retrospective duty assessment for the following reasons:
• Defenders of the status quo claim superiority for the retrospective system because, they say, duty rates are based on a comparison of actual import prices to normal values or subsidies calculated for a contemporaneous period. However, because the prospective system allows the importer to account fully for the antidumping or countervailing duties when making pricing decisions (i.e., where the imports compete with the domestic product), a prospective system may, in fact, do a better job of remedying the injurious effect of dumping or subsidization.
• Prospective systems are better at collecting duties because they collect upon importation. Injured parties do not have to wait through years of administrative and legal reviews and proceedings before unfair competition can be offset.
• Prospective systems are more likely to reduce incentives and opportunities for the evasion of duties because they are clearer in their expectations: normal values or fixed duty rates advise importers in advance of the prices they should apply to goods, information known to authorities with certainty at the time of importation.
• The retrospective system has no reliable way to "target high-risk importers," as it is focused on the prices of goods after they are imported. The prospective system, focused on the price of the goods when they arrive at port, makes the relative "risk" of the importer less relevant.
• The American retrospective system, by creating much more uncertainty in the marketplace, creates competitive advantages for U.S. petitioners (through the advantages of market disruption occasioned by the very filing of trade remedy petitions), but the costs and consequences are visited upon importers, their employees, downstream businesses and their employees, and ultimately U.S. consumers, an inherently unfair distribution of the burdens arising from unfair trade.
• The retrospective system is by far more administratively cumbersome and expensive than the prospective system adopted by every other country and reflected in the principles governing the remedy system of the WTO.
The United States has maintained an expensive and inefficient system unlike any other
country's. The case for the status quo, the Commerce report shows, is weak and biased in favor of petitioners, against importers, consumers, and rational markets. The systematic analysis of retrospective and prospective duty assessment systems that Congress has invited has been overdue. This report, unfortunately, is not likely to lead to warranted change.


 

History Shows That It Pays Respondents To Participate In Trade Disputes At The U.S. International Trade Commission

The US Department of Commerce (“DOC”) initiated 731 antidumping investigations between 1988 and 2008. Three hundred (or 41%) of those investigations did not result in an antidumping order because the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) determined that the imports in question were not the cause of material injury or threat of imminent material injury to a US Industry. Another 81 (or 11%) of those investigations did not result in an antidumping order because DOC terminated or suspended the investigation or found no dumping. Thus, historically, slightly more than half of all antidumping petitions did not result in the imposition of antidumping duties, and about 80 percent of those escaped an antidumping order because of the findings and conclusions of the ITC. These historical results demonstrate that it pays for respondents to defend their interests before the Commissioners.


The benefits of participating at the ITC can be shown by comparing the statistics for cases involving Chinese merchandise (whose respondents typically do not participate actively) to cases involving merchandise from all other countries (whose respondents generally do participate actively). During the same 20 year period indicated above (1988-2008), DOC initiated 124 antidumping cases against products from the People’s Republic of China. The ITC made negative injury and threat of injury determinations in 26 of those cases (or 21%). By contrast, 45% of the antidumping investigations brought against non-Chinese merchandise in those same years resulted in negative ITC determinations and no antidumping order. Although there undoubtedly are many reasons contributing to this disparity, one that cannot be denied is that a party has a better chance to succeed when it participates actively than when it remains on the sidelines.

Appreciation Of The Full Process: There Are Benefits To Be Had At The ITC


Most Chinese respondents seem to believe that they must participate at the DOC when confronted with dumping or subsidy allegations, but that they can ignore the ITC. This belief, which may be based on a misunderstanding of the U.S. trade remedies system (or a reflection of China’s own), is self-defeating. DOC participation is important, but participation at the ITC is no less so, assuming the objective of participation at all is to retain access to the U.S. market. DOC is part of the executive branch of the U.S. government, created primarily to promote and protect domestic industry. The ITC, by contrast, is an agency wholly independent of the executive branch, bipartisan by law, charged with studying world markets for Congress and therefore staffed with competent professionals generally free of protectionist biases.


To initiate an investigation, DOC has a check-off list to make sure a petition makes the required claims as to dumping or subsidies, and injury. DOC undertakes no serious analysis as to whether a U.S. industry is injured or threatened with injury, which is left entirely to the ITC. US law and WTO rules provide that findings of dumping or subsidies do not permit the imposition of duties without a finding of injury (or threat of injury) to an industry in the importing country caused by the dumped or subsidized imports.


The ITC does not assume that, because the U.S. producers may be losing sales or profits (typical indicia of injury), the allegedly dumped or subsidized imports are a cause of the apparent injury. Instead, the ITC must by law consider whether other factors are the cause, including changes in technologies, customer requirements, market conditions, domestic industry efficiency and competitiveness, and third-country competition.


The ITC depends on information provided by the parties to determine causes of injury. When Chinese companies fail to participate at the ITC, or participate with little effort and energy, the ITC is constrained to base its determinations on a record shaped predominantly by the petitioners seeking to impose an order. Notwithstanding views we commonly hear from outside the United States, and especially in China, the ITC has proved in its procedures and results that it wants to hear from both sides in a trade dispute. Even as the law contains its own biases (an evenly split 3-3 vote in the Commission, for example, is awarded to the petitioner), the Commission and its staff generally want to protect domestic industries only when they need protection.  However, it is very difficult for them to reach even-handed conclusions when they hear from only one side.


Participation Should Begin At The Beginning


The ITC conducts its investigations in two phases. In the preliminary phase, the ITC must decide within 45 days of the filing of the petition whether there is a reasonable indication that the US industry is injured or threatened with injury by reason of the imports in question. The ITC, thus, must decide within 45 days whether there is enough evidence indicating injury (or threat of injury) to be worth investigating further and requiring DOC to investigate further. A negative determination here would end the case.


The threshold for finding a likelihood of injury if more evidence were gathered is low, but the Commission and its staff frame the issues during this preliminary phase and identify most of the sources from which they will gather evidence. Absence from the proceedings during this phase means failing to help the Commission organize and structure its investigation. Unfortunately, Chinese industry rarely reacts quickly enough to a petition to appear and participate effectively at the ITC before the Commission is required by statute to issue its preliminary determination.


Although few investigations end in the preliminary phase at the ITC, it has happened, in the recent Certain Steel Fasteners From China and in Steel Wire Form China but, in both cases the petitions were filed against multiple countries which probably helped the Chinese cause in that those countries likely hired counsel to defend at the ITC. When it does, everything ends, including especially the greatest expense, which is in responding to DOC questionnaires and participating in verification. All that activity is mooted by a negative preliminary determination at the ITC. So, although such an outcome is improbable, the relative investment is small for the potential gain.


The ITC continues with its investigation, following an affirmative preliminary determination, even while DOC is still deciding whether subject merchandise is being subsidized or dumped, but the ITC will not finish its investigation unless DOC issues final affirmative determinations. The ITC then issues additional questionnaires (much more extensive and tailored to the specific product than those used in the preliminary phase), to the domestic manufacturers, importers, purchasers and foreign producers. These questionnaires are heavily influenced by the parties, on both sides when both sides participate, by the petitioners when they alone invest in the process. The ITC also considers the interested parties' comments submitted during a briefing and hearing, but based on the record evidence.


Chinese Companies Have Prevailed At The ITC


In Manganese Sulfate from the People’s Republic of China, DOC found a margin of about 32%, entirely the result of a very high surrogate value assigned to ocean freight. All international shipping is purchased in US dollars and does not generally vary much by carrier; DOC, nonetheless, assigned a surrogate value much higher than the amount actually paid, an example of the “engineering” of a result that has not been uncommon historically at DOC. The story was different at the ITC, where both the foreign respondent and the U.S. importer participated actively, beginning with the preliminary phase and the development of the factual record. They persuaded the ITC that their product did not compete with the domestic product, not through a conventional argument that the Chinese product was cheaper and sold to a different buyer, but because it was superior and could be used, unlike the domestic product, for both fertilizer and as a nutritional additive for animal feed. The result in the judgment of the ITC: different product, different markets, no injury.


In Refined Antimony Trioxide from the People’s Republic of China. the largest Chinese respondent cooperated with DOC and actively participated at the ITC. DOC found a margin of 13% for the primary Chinese respondent; the ITC, however, found that those imports did not cause injury to a US industry. As a result of the ITC finding, no antidumping order was imposed.


These cases are old, and there are few examples. The problem is not in the impossibility of winning, nor in any particular bias against China. The problem is in the failure to accept and participate in the process. Had the Chinese companies not participated at the ITC, in these cases, the ITC would have heard only the petitioner and dumping orders likely would have been imposed. In the case of antimony trioxide, the domestic U.S. industry was very profitable; its complaint against Chinese imports was unjustified. The domestic industry did not expect the Chinese to defend themselves at the ITC, and thought it would be easy, therefore, to shut the Chinese out of the U.S. market by relying on protectionist impulses at DOC. Petitioners’ counsel remarked privately, following the final negative ITC determination, that it was the first case they had lost against China, principally because Chinese companies routinely abandoned the U.S. market rather than rely on legal proceedings.


Some Chinese companies have made recent ITC appearances, but they remain exceptional. The Chinese Government, in subsidies cases, has not appeared, even as other foreign governments appear at the ITC when their programs are alleged to be the source of injury to a domestic U.S. industry. And even when the outcome at the ITC is not favorable to respondents, a solid evidentiary record can matter. In perhaps the most celebrated trade dispute of all, a NAFTA panel and the Court of International Trade reversed the ITC and found neither injury nor threat of injury to American softwood lumber producers, based on the record compiled by Canadian industry the Canadian and provincial governments at the ITC.
 

China-U.S. Relations And International Trade 美中关系和国际贸易

Note: Dr. Elliot Feldman on April 15, 2010 presented the following speech at AmCham-China’s Conference of the Asia-Pacific Council of American Chambers of Commerce (APCAC).

中文请点击这里

Difficulties with China are now on Page One of The New York Times and The Washington Post almost every day. There is consensus in Washington that relations between China and the United States will get worse before they get better. There are many issues, most related only marginally, if at all, to trade. As examples, there is frustration in Washington that China does not share a western view of the nuclear threat from Iran, nor the urgency of the nuclear threat from North Korea. There is disappointment and chagrin over Copenhagen, and obvious disagreement over Taiwan and over the Dalai Lama. These issues are mostly strategic, sometimes cultural. Cooperation on them would go a long way toward calming concerns in other areas. There is no sign, however, of mutual understanding.

There are many additional issues dividing China and the United States that are economic. The most obvious is that China, as of January, held $2.4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, of which nearly $900 billion was in U.S. Treasury bonds and securities. The reserves had grown $453 billion in 2009, and economists predict similar growth again in 2010.

No less important to the United States and other countries is the valuation of the RMB. After the end of the dollar peg in July 2005, the RMB appreciated over 20 percent against the dollar. With the global economic crisis, however, China froze the RMB and let its value relative to other world currencies drift down with the dollar. Premier Wen Jiabao dashed American hopes last month that China would permit some adjustment any time soon.

Within the U.S. administration it is said that the word “currency” is not to be spoken, but the characterization of the associated issues as “mercantilism” seems more than tolerated. Meetings between Chinese and American leadership since September 15, 2008 frequently have invoked references to “rebalancing,” the idea that Americans should save more, Chinese should spend more, and Chinese exports to the United States should decline as they find a market at home among consuming Chinese. Such rebalancing, endorsed publicly by both countries, is difficult, however, when an undervalued RMB persistently makes Chinese goods comparatively inexpensive abroad and foreign goods expensive in China.

Both countries, and as important, the governments of both countries, are preoccupied with job creation. Weaker currencies tend to keep jobs at home. Chinese intransigence about currency valuation raises doubts among Americans, however, about the sincerity of Chinese pledges to rebalance. Those doubts are shared, perhaps even more acutely, in Europe. In a form of diplomatic jiu-jitsu, Premier Wen has called the U.S. demand for currency adjustment “a type of trade protectionism,” and Commerce Minister Chen Deming has escalated the rhetoric, threatening that American action on currency would precipitate a trade war that, he insisted ominously, the United States would lose.

Many in Congress, and some in the Administration, want to make currency valuation a trade issue, which perhaps Premier Wen already has done for them by calling it one, confirmed by Minister Chen. Countervailing duty petitions now routinely allege currency valuation as an illegal subsidy (three times in 2009 alone), and many in Congress, and in the business community, want the Treasury Department to label China a currency manipulator. The U.S. Department of Commerce, however, consistently refuses to investigate the allegation, concluding each time that the elements of an export subsidy have not been pleaded sufficiently, particularly as to the subsidy law’s specificity test: the laws and regulations pertaining to valuation of the RMB, Commerce has concluded, are not specific to any industry or group of industries in China, nor is the valuation conditioned on exports.

This legal conclusion has enabled both the Bush and Obama Administrations to avoid a major confrontation with China over the RMB in trade remedy cases, while both Administrations have refused, at least so far, to acquiesce to congressional pressure. The aggressive language adopted by Premier Wen and Minister Chen on this subject, however, could change the dynamic and make it much more difficult for President Obama to hold the line. The postponement of a Treasury Department determination, an apparent trade-off for President Hu’s visit to Washington this week, may only preserve a U.S. card that could be played, in any event, only once.

While China’s exports benefit from an undervalued RMB, China insists that it is contributing to global economic and financial stability, and points to its faster recovery from global recession. China’s friends remind critics of the role of a stable Chinese currency more than a decade ago in halting an Asian financial meltdown. China is not without defenses for its conduct over currency valuation.

In view of the non-trade issues – and the internet dispute over Google is many things, including strategy, technology, human rights, but also trade -- it is arguable whether “pure” trade disputes between China and the United States, trade remedy actions regarding allegations of dumping, subsidies, safeguards, patent and trademark infringements, are all that important. The value of Chinese goods exported to the United States peaked in 2008; less than 2 percent of the value of those goods were subjected in 2009 – the year when U.S. manufacturers were most severely impacted by world trade conditions -- to trade remedy investigations. The official U.S. trade line, in every Administration, reflects such data and has had the following elements:

• The Administration is following the laws as set out by Congress, nothing more;
• There is considerable friction in every significant trade relationship;
• Such friction is normal and indicative of a healthy relationship;
• Trade disputes represent a tiny fraction of overall trade and should be considered nothing more than irritants.

Unfortunately, U.S. trading partners rarely see the disputes this way. While successive Administrations try to minimize them, another branch of the U.S. government, Congress, takes them very seriously and promotes them. Congress, and American trading partners, see trade disputes as economically, politically, even diplomatically important, while Presidents try to ignore them. President Bush, it is said, was amazed at how distressed Canadians were over the treatment of Canada’s softwood lumber exports to the United States. Yet, the trade represented between $7 and $10 billion annually, and there were many U.S. Senators signing letters, testifying at International Trade Commission hearings, and lobbying the Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce. Frequent representations were made by the Canadian Ambassador. For years, no Canadian prime minister failed to raise the issue with the president whenever they met. It probably should have occurred to the president that, since it was apparently important to everyone else, it just might be important.

There is a similar imbalance in trade disputes with China, and to date a similar presidential inclination to minimize them. Although I believe President Obama did what he had to do politically and legally with respect to commercial tires from China in September 2009, and that he acted with as much diplomatic sensitivity as possible within the requirements of the law, I also believe that he underestimated the Chinese reaction just as President Bush misunderstood how the U.S. treatment of softwood lumber was poisoning relations with Canada. The U.S. Department of Commerce, which answers to the President, is, and always has been, systematically deaf to complaints from foreign governments, invoking the mantra that the disputes are minor, normal, even healthy. The apparatus of the Department, meanwhile, and the biases of the laws, are organized and designed to protect the interests of U.S. industry against foreign competition. China, like Japan and Canada before, do not see trade disputes the way Presidents and the Commerce Department see them, and for China, as occasionally for other countries, there are additional, non-economic issues of national pride. Canadians, for example, were furious at the transparent American disrespect for the rule of law in the lumber litigation.

The United States tends to underestimate the Chinese Government’s sensitivity to domestic interests. The Western press has been translating this sensitivity into “hubris” or “triumphalism,” even simple “arrogance,” but whatever it might be called, Chinese concerns for domestic interests reflect a sense of national pride.

The Western press also underestimates internal Chinese debate. The voices of a harder line are heard, notwithstanding the many moderate and engaged voices among elites. Unfortunately, the same is true as to what the Chinese hear from the United States.

Most important to China has been the refusal of the United States to treat China as a market economy. Legally and financially, non-recognition enhances the ability of U.S. industry to succeed in antidumping complaints. Politically and psychologically, however, the issue is far more important. The Communist Party believes it is governing a capitalist state that, economically, should be treated like every other capitalist state. The indicia of a market economy, governed by supply and demand, contracting labor, and competition, are everywhere in China. It is decidedly not a command economy like the Soviet Union.

The United States sees something else. It sees national planning, central control, and a restricted currency. It sees dominant government banks and state-owned enterprises.

When China as a government appears in trade remedy disputes, for example, its counsel sometimes represent the principal Chinese enterprises as well as the Chinese government. This inherent conflict of interest raises doubt about the independence from the government of these enterprises. The counsel for no other foreign governments appear in U.S. proceedings simultaneously representing supposedly private enterprises. It is widely presumed that the Chinese enterprises engage the government’s counsel at the government’s direction. China and the United States are, thus, looking past each other as to China’s very identity.

In November 2006, right after congressional elections produced a Democratic majority, the Bush Administration, while refusing to recognize China as a market economy, nevertheless accepted a petition to investigate Chinese government programs alleged to confer countervailable subsidies on goods exported from China to the United States. A countervailable subsidy, until that time, had been treated in U.S. law as a market-distorting government subsidy. Inasmuch as the United States denied that China had a market, government support would have nothing to distort. The United States Department of Commerce, however, cheered on by Congress and supported by the rest of the Administration, was not deflected by this apparent anomaly. The Chinese Government would now have to answer questions sent to it by the United States Department of Commerce, and would have to receive Commerce Department auditors who would inspect government books and test the veracity of government answers, all the while being treated as a non-market economy.

This recipe for confrontation did not produce a satisfying meal for anyone. Chinese officials were insulted and often adjusted doubtfully to the diplomatic cooperation the new investigations required. U.S. Embassy personnel in Beijing and officials from Washington were not unwilling to make their dissatisfaction with China known. Moreover, U.S. officials began to accuse Chinese officials, in print, that they had not been entirely truthful or accurate in responding to American inquiries. In one published preliminary determination, the Department of Commerce alleged that, “the GOC has withheld the information requested by the Department,” and “the GOC has failed to act to the best of its ability.” The Department declared, “the GOC’s claims of non-use are incorrect as a matter of fact,” and “the GOC’s statements . . . are unreliable and are contradicted by other facts on the record.” I am not aware of comments of this type printed in the Federal Register about other governments.

The multiplying investigations have not enhanced relationships, regardless whether the cases have involved much money or little, or whether the products in dispute have been significant or trivial. The process, and the underlying premises, which the United States insisted was business as usual, have been damaging. In the slow economic recovery we all anticipate in the United States, there will be more cases, more misunderstanding, and more difficulty.

China’s worldwide exports increased from 1999 to 2008 from $195 billion to $1.4 trillion. One of the great surprises accompanying this growth is how few trade complaints, compared to the scale of the growth, that it produced. There were 21 antidumping cases brought against China worldwide in 1999 (often against the same product but in several countries). While China’s exports multiplied seven-fold, in 2008 only 52 new cases were brought against Chinese products (again, often involving the same product but in several different countries). The United States, between July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2008, became China’s leading export destination and China’s leading trade antagonist, with 18 initiated cases. During the previous decade, however, India initiated 120 antidumping cases against Chinese products while becoming China’s leading trade partner in goods; the United States, by contrast, initiated 87, barely more than the European Community, which initiated 84.

Although these numbers for formal disputes are surprisingly small under the circumstances (for the volume and variety of trade), there are at least a couple of notable trends. One is that the number of cases initiated against Chinese products has increased every year except in 2007, albeit in small increments. Another is that more cases are brought against Chinese products around the world than against the products of any other country, by far. Against no other country is so much suspicion expressed about business dealings, honest reporting, and sincere cooperation in the interests of free trade. Since accession to the WTO, China has begun to test trade remedies itself. It initiated 14 antidumping cases against the products of other countries in 2001, more than doubled that number, to 30, in 2002, and through 2008 had initiated 151 antidumping investigations against foreign products. The United States was one of its first targets (along with Japan), and is now its leading target.

When negotiating accession to the WTO, China sought concessions because of its self-characterization as a developing country, a forgiving explanation for a transition from a government-controlled economy. China graduated very quickly from this self-definition, although it still invokes it frequently. It has now initiated three different subsidies investigations, all into products from the United States. In the case against automobiles, initiated on the eve of President Obama’s visit to China last November, the application for duties endorsed by China’s Ministry of Commerce proclaimed a declining United States unfairly trading with an ascendant China. It claimed technical superiority in a pillar industry, what it called the key industry of America’s industrial revolution.

This development, I submit, is of dramatic implication and potential consequence. The United States, since 2006, routinely entertains petitions against China complaining of subsidies due to state-owned banks and state enterprises. China has responded with a complaint about the U.S. bailout of the Big 3 automobile manufacturers and the infusion of capital into U.S. banks. China alleges non-market loan guarantees and special loans to the U.S. steel industry. More jiu-jitsu: China is accusing the United States of government involvement in the economy in programs nearly identical to U.S. allegations against China, and China has begun bringing cases against the United States at the WTO, a forum in which the United States usually wins the cases it initiates, but usually loses the ones brought against it.

The United States is an historic sore loser at the WTO, in one celebrated instance taking more than five years to comply with an adverse decision. China, by contrast, promptly capitulated when the United States brought its first two complaints against it, by requesting consultations, at the WTO; now, the world will watch how the United States responds as China brings more complaints against the United States. To date, China has made a doubtful strategic choice, to appeal its trade disagreements exclusively to the WTO, never seeking recourse in U.S. courts. Between the pattern of American non-compliance at the WTO, for which there are few punitive mechanisms available and all remedies are prospective, and the decision to permit adverse administrative precedents to accumulate without legal challenge, Chinese frustration with the United States as a trading partner is likely to grow, even as the partners can hardly escape one another.

China, it seems, is responding to the United States by acting like the United States. Whatever the poetic justice, this course is perilous. China, unlike the United States, is still dominated by state-owned enterprises, does provide central direction to important segments of its economy, and is still learning how to conduct business in trade remedy disputes.

At a more policy-based level, the United States appears, at the behest of Asian countries, to be in hot pursuit of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which looks and feels like an economic reincarnation of George Kennan’s cold war approach to the Soviet Union. China, so far, apparently has said nothing, and there is more than enough skepticism, in the United States and abroad, about the trajectory of the TPP despite American enthusiasm. China, nonetheless, cannot be pleased by an even implied encirclement, and an answer to the question of what the United States will gain from this initiative seems to be buried in unexamined assumptions.

These developments, taken together, are unnecessarily ominous. Asian countries are urging the United States to engage more in Asia because, they readily say, they are afraid of China. While China is flexing the muscles of a world power, it is still the fragile developing country it claimed to be only a few short years ago. Tensions in trade are symptomatic of other problems. They are also the essence, because trade and commerce constitute functional interaction more than anything outside armed combat. Trade disputes, it is true, are but a tiny fraction of trade, and there are fewer of them than might be justified given the clash of systems, defiance of rules on all sides, and fundamental underlying political needs, above all for jobs. But they resonate.

Governments in Beijing and in Washington both need to find more jobs for their populations. Both need to promote production and exports. The only possible compromises require consensus about what the rules should be and how they should be obeyed. Those compromises require trade policies.

Trade disputes shape trade policy. The pursuit of trade disputes is determined in U.S. law by the petitions of private enterprise that the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission can rarely avoid investigating. By contrast, Chinese law permits the Ministry of Commerce to keep the existence of petitions secret, and the initiation of investigations to be determined by the Ministry’s private assessment of the “public interest,” a provision that does not exist in U.S. law. Consequently, China can, and does, have a trade policy. The United States can have one only with difficulty, and at present has none. U.S. trade policy, such as it is, inherently is protectionist because it follows the protectionist inclinations of private enterprise in hard times. China’s trade policy, unfortunately, is equally or even more protectionist, and is unquestionably the product of government choice. Today, it is hard to tell the pot from the kettle because they are both black.

The United States needs a policy, and China needs a new one. Like almost every major international issue today, this one dividing the United States and China requires the two countries to work together from first principles. They need to examine together what defines and runs and regulates markets. They need to decide together how to keep markets open and free and how to assure fair treatment of foreign investments. That China is standing up to the United States at the WTO is good – it is about time someone besides the European Community and occasionally Japan or others did. It is also not so good if it means antagonism rather than accommodation.

The United States needs to understand that the lack of democracy in China does not mean government unconscious of its responsibility to its people; China needs to understand that central paralysis of American institutions does not necessarily mean American weakness. Both have to keep reminding themselves, lest every now and again they seem to forget, how much they need each other.

I want to conclude briefly with some practical suggestions about how the private sector might respond in these antagonistic times. There are things you can do to cushion the shocks and protect your interests without necessarily changing government policies. The operating assumptions here are that, on the one hand, there will be more trade disputes, and more orders imposing duties and restricting trade; and on the other hand, that business between the two countries will continue to grow.

Should you be a company exporting goods, you should be sure to monitor dumping and subsidy orders in every country where you are doing business, whether in-house or with outside counsel. Even the most sophisticated companies can run afoul of orders, facing penalties and customs duties, because they have not monitored thoroughly. Chinese companies that are exporting should examine carefully the loans they are taking from Chinese banks. They should consider whether they are receiving better-than-market terms, and whether they are exposed to allegations of benefitting from government subsidies. Exporters should learn everything they can about their foreign competition, especially regarding pricing and costs of production: careful pricing can minimize risks of dumping allegations. Such study could also lead to the acquisition of foreign companies. Ownership can reduce dramatically exposure to trade remedy actions. Exporters should cultivate relations with importers, for it is important to have allies in countries where you are doing business. And Chinese companies should make sure they are perceived as private and independent of government.

There are many practical things American companies doing business in China can do to help themselves. They can enlist in trade associations that lobby the U.S. government, beyond the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. They can participate in, or seek to create, boards or commissions to advise the government. Like Chinese companies, American companies now should be wary of better-than-market bank loans or subsidies, especially in agriculture and steel, and like Chinese companies cultivating relations with importers in the United States, American companies should cultivate relations with importers in China.

The corporate world does not control its own destiny, but it need not be tossed without recourse in a turbulent sea. Every company, and every industry, can make things better for itself and, by so doing, contribute to an overall improvement in a bilateral relationship that sorely needs improvement.
 

注:费德门博士4月15日在中国美国商会在北京举行的Asia-Pacific Council of American Chambers of Commerce (APCAC) 会议上发表以下演讲。 

《纽约时报》和《华盛顿邮报》几乎每天都在头版报道中美间问题。华盛顿各界已经达成共识:美中关系将首先恶化才会有所改善。两国间有许多问题,其中只有少数和贸易有关。例如,中国和西方世界在伊朗核威胁以及朝鲜半岛核问题上存在分歧,这让华盛顿沮丧。哥本哈根会谈亦让人失望,两国对台湾和达赖也有不同认识。这些大都是战略性议题,有时是文化差异。两国在这些问题上的合作将有助于减弱其他领域的担忧。但是,没有迹象表明两国达成共识。

      其他导致美中分歧的议题隶属于经济领域。最引人注目的是截至今年一月底中国持有2.4万亿美元外汇储备,其中9000亿美元为美国国债。中国外汇储备在2009年增长了4530亿美元,同时经济学家预计2010年增幅将于2009年持平。

      对美国和其他国家而言,人民币汇率也令人关注。当中国于2005年7月结束紧跟美元的货币政策之后,人民币币值较美元已经增长超过百分之二十。但是在全球性经济危机面前,中国决定暂时冻结人民币增值、让人民币币值和其他货币币值一样与美元一起跌落。中国总理温家宝上月宣布中国近期不会调整人民币币值,泼了美国一头冷水。

      据传“货币”一词是本届美国政府内禁止使用的词语,但是与此相关的“重商主义”的指责却被纵容。自2008年9月15日以来,美中领导人间的会谈时常引用“重新平衡”这一概念,具体而言美国应该增加储蓄,而中国应该扩大消费;同时中国对美出口应随着国内消费的增长而缩减。这一重新平衡虽然在公开场合得到两国政府的认可,但在实际操作中却很困难,因为人民币币值过低导致中国产品在海外市场价格过低、而国外产品在中国却过于昂贵。

      两国及两国政府都忙于创造就业机会。货币疲软可帮助创造国内就业机会。中国拒绝人民币升值让美国质疑中国是否真的决心重新平衡。欧洲也和美国一样怀疑中国的承诺。在外交柔道中,温家宝总理指责美国要求人民币升值是“贸易保护主义的表现”。中国商务部长陈德明使这一指控进一步升级——威胁美国如果就汇率采取行动将导致贸易战,而且将以美国的失败告终。

       众多美国议员以及美国政府内的部分人士希望把汇率问题转变成贸易议题,温总理的指责、陈部长的强化已经帮助这些美国人士实现了这一转变。反补贴申请书时常把汇率列为不正当补贴(2009年出现三次)。同时许多国会人士以及商业团体希望美国财政部把中国列为汇率操纵者。美国商务部却坚持拒绝调查这一反补贴指控,每次都得出这一出口补贴指控证据不足的结论,尤其不符合反补贴法的特定性(针对性)要求——美国商务部总结道有关人民币币值的法规都不是具体针对某一产业或是某些产业,同时币值也不仅仅和出口相关。

      这一法律结论帮助布什政府和奥巴马政府避免就人民币汇率问题和中国在贸易案中产生激烈冲突,同时两届政府都婉转拒绝了国会压力。但是温家宝总理和陈德明部长使用的强烈词句却改变了这一微妙局势,使奥巴马总统更难坚守阵线。美国财政部推迟做出决定无疑是因为胡锦涛主席本周访问美国,但只能推迟一次。

       虽然中国出口受益于币值偏低的人民币,中国却坚持这一政策有助于国际经济和货币稳定,有助于国际经济复苏。中国的朋友提醒批评家中国货币稳定在十年前为遏制亚洲经济危机的蔓延立下汗马功劳。但是现在中国却没有任何理由可以辩护自己的货币政策。

       当考虑非贸易领域议题时(互联网上关于谷歌,包括战略、科技和人权的争议,同时也涉及贸易),不仅让人产生中美间“纯”贸易纠纷是否重要的疑问。这些“纯”贸易纠纷包括倾销、补贴、保障措施、商标专利侵权。中国出口至美国的商品价值在2008抵达顶峰;在2009年面临贸易纠纷的中国商品的价值仅占出口总值的百分之二;而同一年美国生产商遭受到最严重的贸易打击。每界美国政府的贸易政策都反映这些数据,并包括以下内容:

• 政府遵循国会制定的法律,仅限于此;
• 每一重要贸易关系中都存在重大摩擦;
• 这种摩擦是正常的,证明两国关系健康;
• 贸易摩擦只占贸易总量的一小部分,因此应仅仅被视为小烦恼。

      令人遗憾的是,美国的贸易伙伴却对贸易摩擦有不同看法。当美国政府竭力减弱摩擦,另一重要权力机构——国会却非常重视并极力提升摩擦的重要性。国会和美国的贸易伙伴认为贸易摩擦具有经济、政治、乃至外交重要性,而总统却试图忽视这些重要性。据说布什总统对加拿大人对加拿大软木对美出口的沮丧程度感到惊讶。这一贸易每年的贸易量达到70至100亿美金,许多美国参议员致信并在美国国际贸易委员会听证会上作证、游说美国贸易代表办公室和美国商务部。许多年来,每一任加拿大总理与美国总统会谈时都不忘提及软木贸易。布什总统应当认识到,如果这一贸易对其他人来说都很重要,那么应当给予足够重视。

      美中贸易纠纷中也有这样的不平衡,同时总统也同样不愿缩小贸易纠纷。虽然2009年9月奥巴马总统就中国商业轮胎采取的行动是正确的政治、法律行动,同时他在法律允许的范围内充分重视其政治敏感性,我认为它低估了中国的反应就像布什总统低估了美国对加拿大对软木纠纷的反应。总统直接管辖的美国商务部一直对国外政府的抱怨置若罔闻,哼唱这些摩擦微小、正常乃至健康的高调。同时商务部的有关机构以及运用的法律却是为了在国外竞争面前保护美国产业的利益。与美国总统及商务部不同,中国和日本、加拿大一样,对贸易摩擦持不同看法。中国看到国家尊严受损,其他国家有时也这么看待贸易摩擦。例如,加拿大对美国在软木案件中公开不尊重法律表示愤怒。

      美国常常低估中国政府对国内利益的敏感程度。西方媒体把这种敏感翻译成“傲慢”或是“耀武扬威”,但是无论使用哪个形容词,中国对国内内利益的担忧都反射出民族荣誉感。

      西方媒体同时也低估了中国国内的争论。他们只听到强硬派的声音,然而中国精英层中也有缓和派和提倡加强与美对话的声音。令人遗憾的是,中国也只听到强硬派的声音。

      对中国而言,给予中国市场经济地位是最重大的事件。无论从法律还是金融角度看,拒绝给予中国市场经济地位都有助于美国产业在反倾销申诉中获胜。但从政治和精神角度着眼,这一事件有更重大的意义。中国共产党认为她领导的这一从经济学角度来看已成为资本主义经济的国家应和其他资本主义国家享受同样的地位。市场经济体的主要指标——供需主导、劳工雇佣和竞争都在中国随处可见。她和苏联不同,决不是指导性经济。

      但美国有不同看法。她看到全国性计划、中央控制、以及受限制的货币。她看到国有银行和国有企业占主导地位。

      当中国政府应诉贸易纠纷时,她聘请的律师同时代表政府和中国企业。这一做法让人怀疑这些企业是否不受政府操纵。其他国家政府聘请的美国律师决不会同时代表政府和私营企业参与应诉。外界普遍认为中国聘请政府使用的律师是受政府指导。中美再次擦肩而过。

       2006年11月,即民主党在中期选举中获胜、拥有参众两院多数席位后不久,布什政府拒绝承认中国的市场经济地位,同时又受理了一份要求对中国政府给予对美出口品不正当补贴展开调查的申请书。在此之前,美国法律视反补贴为扭曲市场的政府补助。既然美国否认中国的市场经济地位,政府补助与市场扭曲就没有任何关联。美国商务部在国会及其他政府部门的鼓动下,却执意坚持这一反常做法。中国政府现在需要回答美国商务部发布的调查问卷,同时也必需接受美国商务部对中国政府账本和调查问卷的审计,同时还被视为非市场经济国家。

      双方都对此深感不满。中国官员对这类调查需要的外交合作不是深感不满就是深感怀疑。美国使馆人员以及从华盛顿飞往北京的美国官员也毫不掩饰他们的不满。此外,美国官员开始白纸黑字地指责中国官员在回答问卷是不完全诚实或准确。在一份发表的初审裁决中,美国商务部指控“中国政府向美国商务部隐瞒信息”,“中国政府没有竭尽所能”。美国商务部声称:“中国政府声称没有使用这些项目是错误的,事实上中国政府的声明不可信而且自相矛盾。”我从未在Federal Register上看到这样评论其他政府的文字。

      不管这些调查的涉案金额大小,也不管涉案产品的重要程度,多项调查并没有改进双边关系。虽然美国坚持认为这些调查是例行公务,但是这些调查不可避免损害了双边关系。这一调查进程以及其深层含义都损害了双边关系。当美国经济缓慢复苏时,将会有更多的案件、误解和困难。

     中国的全球出口从1999年的1950亿美金上升至2008年的1.4万亿美金。令人惊讶的是,和增幅相比,贸易申诉的增幅却滞后。1999年全球共有21起针对中国的反倾销案件(常常针对同一产品但是却发生于不同国家)。2008年,当中国出口是1999年的七倍时,仅有52起针对中国产品的反倾销调查(同样,多个国家针对同一产品展开调查)。从2007年7月1日至2008年6月30日,作为中国最大的出口市场——美国仅对中国产品展开18项调查。在过去十年里,印度在成长为中国贸易伙伴的同时共对中国产品展开120起反倾销调查,而美国仅展开87起调查,稍稍高于欧盟总数84起调查。

     虽然这些正式纠纷从贸易量及贸易种类来看都令人惊讶的微弱,但是其中有两个令人瞩目的趋势。其一,针对中国产品的案件逐年上升,除2007年之外。其二,与其他国家产品相比,中国产品是全球范围内最容易面临指控的产品。中国的商业方式、诚信、以及自由贸易合作面临最多质疑。自加入世界贸易组织以来,中国开始展开贸易补助调查。2001年中国展开了14起反倾销调查,2002年展开30项调查;至2008年总计展开151项反倾销调查。美国(和日本)是第一起中国对外反倾销调查的对象,迄今是主要目标之一。

     当谈判加入世贸组织时,因为把自己定位为发展中国家的中国寻求让步,也使用了从政府控制经济转型的借口。中国很快超越了发展中国家的定位,虽然这仍引发争议。中国目前已展开三项反补贴调查,都是针对美国产品。在奥巴马总统访华前夕,也就是去年11月,中国对美国汽车展开反补贴调查,调查申请书认为下降中的美国与上升中的中国展开不公平贸易,这一看法得到中国商务部认可。申请书认为中国在这一支柱产业——美国工业革命中的关键产业占技术优势。

     鄙人认为这一进展具有重大含义和后果。自2006年以来美国不断接要求对中国国有银行和企业提供的补助展开调查的申请书。中国的回答是:一份要求对美国政府拯救三大汽车生产商及向美国银行注入资金展开反补助调查的申请书。中国同时主张美国钢铁产业收到非市场化的贷款担保和特殊但款。更多的柔道技术:中国指责美国政府对经济的干预程度和中国政府的行动几乎程度相当,中国同时也在世贸组织递交针对美国的案件。在这一法律论坛中,美国作为申诉方,通常胜诉;但作为应诉方,通常失利。

       美国在历史上是世贸组织酸溜溜的输家,在一著名案件中,美国用了五年时间在履行不利裁决。相反,中国在两个案件中迅速向美国妥协,而美国仅递交了磋商请求,案件尚未正式展开。现在,全世界都在观察美国将怎样回应中国的申诉。迄今为止,中国仅仅利用世贸组织、而不利用美国法庭的战略令人怀疑。美国惯于不履行世贸组织裁决,也没有很多的惩罚手段,而且惩罚都是针对未来的行动;同时中国不对不利的行政裁决采取法律行动。中国对美国这一贸易伙伴的沮丧情绪只会日益剧增。

      看来中国正以以其人之道,还治其人之身的方法回应美国。虽然这一做法诗意般的正义,但方向却是危险的。中国和美国不同,国有企业占主导地位,并向各经济领域提供指导性意见,同时政府在贸易纠纷中还发挥作用。

      在政策领域,美国现正积极推行“跨太平洋伙伴关系”(Trans-Pacific Partnership),这类似于冷战期间布凯南推行的针对苏联的经济遏制。中国现在还未就此发表评论,但是美国国内和海外都对此深表怀疑。中国肯定也这种遏制感到很不开心。美国能从这一政策中获得何种利益仍不可知。

      这些进展的综合意义重大。亚洲国家要求美国加强和亚洲国家的合作,因为他们害怕中国。当中国正跃跃欲试、努力成为世界霸权,她仍是一个脆弱的发展中国家。

       贸易关系进展是其它矛盾的象征。它同时也异常重要,因为商贸是继武力对抗之后最重要的工具型互动。贸易纠纷只占贸易总量的一小部分。但是它们共鸣。

       两国政府都应当创造更多本国就业机会;都需要扩大生产和出口。取得妥协的唯一方法是就法律条规以及如何遵守法律条规达成共识。这些妥协需要贸易政策。

       贸易纠纷改变贸易政策。美国法律制度中贸易纠纷产生机制是私营企业向美国商务部和美国国际贸易委员会递交申请,两大机构必须展开调查。但是中国法律允许中国商务部不公开申请信息,可根据“公众利益”调查裁定决定是否展开调查。美国法律中没有“公众利益”这一条款,因此,中国确有贸易政策。美国可以拥有贸易政策,虽有一定难度,但现在没有。但是中国的贸易政策与美国一样倾向于保护主义,甚至超过美国。五十步笑百步。

      美国需要一项政策,中国需要一项新政策。和其他任何重要国际事务一样,分化两国关系的事件需要两国共同努力。两国需要一起检验确定、操纵、规范市场的规则。两国需要一起决定如何保证市场开放、自由,公平对待外资。中国在世贸组织向美国发起挑战是一件好事,即欧盟和日本之外,应该有第三个国家这样做。但是如果这意味着敌对就不妥了。

        美国应当认识到虽然中国没有民主,但是这并不意味她会忽视对人民的责任;中国也应当认识到美国中央机构的瘫痪并不意味美国脆弱。两国都应不断提醒自己,他们多么需要对方,但她们常常忘记。

       我将以一些针对私营企业的建设性意见结束我的讲话。您们可以采取行动保护自己的利益、减弱政府行动带来的震荡,同时不改变政府政策。这里的假设是:一,将有更多贸易纠纷,并将导致更多遏制贸易的惩罚性关税;二,两国贸易将持续增长。

       如果您的公司对外出口,您应当让公司律师或是聘请的律师密切关注各国针对您公司所在产业的反补贴、反倾销令。即使是最善于经营、机构完备的公司有时也会产生疏漏,错过一些文件,因而面临高额关税和罚款。涉及出口的中国企业应当仔细检查国内银行提供的贷款。他们应当考虑他们享受的待遇是否超过市场待遇,是否会面临反补贴指控。出口商应当了解海外竞争的方方面面,尤其是定价和生产成本。合理定价可避免反倾销指控。认真研究如何并购国外公司。改变所有权可帮助减弱面临贸易行动的可能性。出口商应当加强和进口商的关系,因为盟友的作用很重要。中国公司应当维护自己私营、不受制于政府的形象。

      在中国从事商业活动的美国公司也可采取行动保护自己。加入游说美国政府、除美国商会之外的贸易协会。它们可以加入、尝试成立董事会或是委员会向政府提供意见参考。和中国企业一样,美国企业,尤其是农业和钢铁企业,应当注意优于市场待遇的贷款和补助。同时就像中国出口商应当加强和美国进口商的关系,美国企业也应进一步巩固和中国进口商的关系。

       企业不能完全控制他们的未来,但是不应将自己的资源放入大海,随波逐流。每个公司、每个产业,都可以改善自己的处境,并以此促进双边关系的发展。 
 

(翻译:朱晶)

 

Trade War? Part II: China Initiates Third CVD Investigation Against U.S. Products 贸易战?(二):中国针对第三项美国产品展开反补贴调查

中文请点击这里

The Chinese Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) announced on November 6, 2009 that it had launched anti-dumping (“AD”) and countervailing (“CVD”) investigations against sedans and sport utility vehicles of cylinder capacity ≥ 2000cc originating from the United States. We are providing on this blog an English translation of the CVD notice. This announcement represents the third CVD investigation initiated against U.S. products in less than six months. So far, Chinese investigations have targeted CVD investigations only against products originating from the United States.

According to the November 6 notice, MOFCOM will investigate 24 alleged subsidy programs, all identified as being provided by the U.S. Government. However, four of those alleged programs are tax incentives and other assistance provided by the state of Michigan, which in the U.S. federal system is a distinct sovereign and not part of the U.S. Government. ( In China, all regional and local governments are subordinate to the central government. In the U.S., the states have distinct powers and are not subordinate.)

China adopted its regulations on CVD investigations in October 2001, and the Regulations Of The People’s Republic Of China On Countervailing Measures entered into force at the beginning of 2002. However, China did not initiate its first CVD investigation until June 1, 2009.

The vocal U.S. steel industry was the first target of Chinese countermeasures. The product under investigation was grain-oriented flat-rolled electrical steel, and an Ohio company – the AK Steel Corporation – and a Pennsylvania producer – the ATI Allegheny Ludlum Corporation – were singled out as respondents.

Soon after President Obama imposed additional tariffs on Chinese commercial, low-cost tires as a China-specific safeguard measure, MOFCOM issued a press release saying it would review AD and CVD petitions against U.S. poultry products and cars. Many observers rushed to label this announcement as “retaliation.” However, both products have been the subject of trade disputes between China and the United States for a long time. Our previous article “Trade War?” analyzed the safeguard action and recent trade disputes between the two sides, querying whether China was retaliating in the opening salvo of a trade war. The initiation of investigations into U.S. automobiles may require an adjustment in our analysis. We expect to post soon an analytical article on China’s investigations of alleged U.S. subsidy programs, particularly as they refer to U.S. automobiles.
 

        中国商务部于2009年11月6日正式宣布对原产于美国的排气量在2.0升及2.0升以上的进口小轿车和越野车展开反倾销、反补贴调查。 本所翻译并在此刊登该案反补贴立案调查公告英文版。不到六个月,这已经是第三起针对美国产品展开的反补贴调查。迄今为止原产于美国的产品是唯一在中国面临反补贴调查的产品。

        11月6日的公告指出,中国商务部将调查24项美国政府补贴。但是,其中四项补贴指控的调查对象是米歇根州向汽车生产商提供的税收优惠以及其他资助。和中国的政治制度不同,在美国联邦体制中,州政府虽然是美国政府的一部分,但拥有特定权利、并不隶属于联邦政府。

        中国早在2001年10月就通过了反补贴法规——《中华人民共和国反补贴条例》,这一条例于2002年1月1日正式生效。但是,直到今年6月1日中国才展开第一起反补贴调查。

        美国钢铁企业首受其冲。受调查的产品是原产于美国的取向电工钢。(注:取向电工钢是电力工业行业不可缺少的一种软磁材料,主要应用于各种类型变压器、整流器、电抗器等行业。)俄亥俄州的AK Steel Corporation 以及宾西法尼亚州的 ATI Allegheny Ludlum Corporation 被选为应诉企业。

        当奥巴马总统在421特保案中宣布对国产轮胎征收额外关税,中国商务部随即发表新闻公告,宣布将对部分美国汽车产品和肉鸡产品启动反倾销和反补贴立案审查程序。许多观察家立即指控这一举措为贸易报复。但是长期以来这些产品一直面临贸易摩擦。在《贸易战?》一文中,我们深入分析了轮胎特保案以及最近发生的其它贸易纠纷,探讨中国的这一举动是否是贸易大战的序幕。现在对美国汽车展开双反调查可能要求我们调整分析。我们计划最近再刊登一篇博文深入分析面临指控的美国政府补贴,尤其是针对美国汽车行业的补贴。

(翻译:朱晶)

U.S. Court Decision Ought To Change Chinese Thinking (Revised and Expanded) 美国法庭裁决应将改变中国思维

中文请点击这里

This article is co-authored by Elliot J. Feldman and John J. Burke.

 Until now, China has preferred the WTO to resolve trade disputes. Of a dozen countervailing duty cases brought against Chinese products, all but one (the coated free sheet paper case failed at the International Trade Commission) went adversely before U.S. agencies and the Government of China challenged none of these final agency determinations in U.S. courts. Instead, China consolidated four of them and complained at the WTO.

We have indicated before our doubts about the wisdom of this choice (see our blog article titled WTO Challenges: Not Always A Panacea For Respondents In Trade Litigation). Now, there is new evidence. In GPX International Tire Corporation v. United States, a case brought before the United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”) by private parties (not the Government of China), Chief Judge Jane Restani found an important flaw in the procedures of the United States Department of Commerce that could return substantial sums of money to importers of Chinese goods and alter the way trade remedy actions are brought and analyzed against China. Although this victory for Chinese interests is less than suggested by its advocates and some in the trade press, it is significant nonetheless and comes at an important time. The Chinese Government has achieved nothing comparable in its efforts at the WTO.

Judge Restani’s decision does not preclude the Department of Commerce from initiating countervailing duty investigations against China or any other non-market economy. In fact, its impact is more likely to be seen in the conduct of antidumping cases against China. Judge Restani held that, when Commerce chooses to apply the countervailing duty law to China with respect to the same products for which it also is calculating antidumping duties, using the non-market economy methodology, Commerce must alter its antidumping calculations to avoid counting the same subsidy twice. She noted that Commerce would have to accomplish this task within the confines of the non-market economy provisions of the antidumping law. She remanded to Commerce to find some way to resolve this problem.

The easiest way for Commerce to resolve the double counting problem, as strongly hinted by Judge Restani, would be to resume its old practice of more than twenty years of not applying the countervailing duty laws to non-market economies. She noted that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the 1986 case, Georgetown Steel, held that Commerce was not required to apply the countervailing duty laws to non-market economies. Many legal commentators had interpreted the Georgetown Steel case as prohibiting the use of countervailing duty laws to non-market economies. Judge Restani acknowledged that interpretation, but held that Georgetown Steel was ambiguous and she herself found the statute ambiguous. Therefore, she deferred to Commerce’s interpretation as "not unreasonable."

Judge Restani implicitly urged Commerce to abandon its adventure in applying the countervailing duty law to non-market economies, but nonetheless gave Commerce the option of altering its antidumping methodologies to prevent double counting. Given all of the political capital the Commerce Department has now invested in applying the countervailing duty laws to China, we expect Commerce will work hard to find a way to resolve this issue through changes in its antidumping calculations, without returning to the conventional interpretation of Georgetown Steel.

Commerce could separate antidumping from countervailing duty cases. It could decline to initiate them together against the same product. The cost of filing may go up for petitioners, but they might be able to preserve the ability to claim both subsidies and dumping. They could, alternatively, not include alleged subsidies in the calculation of cost of production for dumping, and instead allege all subsidies together in the separate countervailing duty petition. There would be no double-counting, but alleged subsidies would not escape scrutiny.

Judge Restani does not exclude these possibilities. To the contrary, she expressly authorizes as “reasonable” petitions alleging subsidies in non-market economies. She denies overturning Georgetown Steel, but she certainly overturns the popular understanding of it for the last two decades.

Judge Restani also overturned Commerce’s automatic use of December 11, 2000, the date China joined the WTO, as the cut-off date for determining whether a subsidy could be calculated in China. Commerce had been countervailing alleged subsidies conferred after that date, but refusing to investigate any allegations of subsidies conferred before that date. Some of the Chinese companies argued that Commerce could not go back any earlier than the date in 1997 when it announced it would apply the CVD law to China. The U.S. producers argued that there should be no cut-off date. Judge Restani ruled that Commerce must decide how far back to go based on the facts of each subsidy allegation. The bottom line for the Chinese Government and Chinese companies is that they now have to be prepared to defend against subsidy allegations reaching back into the 1990s, a serious setback from core arguments advanced by some counsel for China in the CVD cases.

Judge Restani, Chief Judge of the CIT, has long been a rigorous, thoughtful judge willing to reject the arguments of the United States Government and prepared to interpret the law and international agreements as favoring free trade. However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit historically has not been unwilling to overturn her. Occasionally, when she thinks a legal issue especially important and perhaps difficult, she assembles a three-judge panel of the court to hear a case. Three-judge panels have not been overturned in the last twenty years. Consequently, this decision is vulnerable to appeal.

Despite the celebration of a Chinese victory, assuming an unsuccessful appeal, there may be many ways around the rejection of double-counting, leaving China with less of a legal victory than it seems now to think. Nonetheless, although China lost the key legal principle at issue in the case – whether subsidy actions can be brought against non-market economies – it won a point that should mean the return of monies to importers of record in the United States and should complicate life for petitioners who were making the simultaneous filing of antidumping and countervailing duty petitions routine. As narrow as that victory may be, it is substantially more than anything gained to date at the WTO, and more than anything likely to be possible at the WTO as to Chinese exposure to CVD petitions.  It ought  to convey several lessons one of which is that U.S. courts are not necessarily inhospitable to Chinese appeals.  Another ought  to be, like the Chinese proverb, that the road is long, and requires many steps.  This appeal should be the first, not the last, on a journey to justify the practices of the Chinese economy.
 

本文由 Elliot J. Feldman 和 John J. Burke 合著。

        迄今为止,中国仍偏爱通过世贸组织解决贸易争端。在十二个针对中国产品展开的反补贴案中,中方只在一个案件中赢得调查胜利(美国国际贸易委员会否决了铜版纸一案),但是中国政府放弃了在美国法庭上诉这些终审裁决的机会。相反,中国把四个案件整合在一起,向世贸组织递交了申诉

        在先前的文章中,我们已经对这种做法表示怀疑(见博文《世贸组织争端解决机制 ----不是贸易纠纷应诉方的万能药》)。现在,又有新证据证明我们的论点。在美国国际贸易法庭受理的GPX International Tire Corporation v. United States 一案中,中国企业(而非中国政府)提出上诉,首席法官Jane Restani裁定美国商务部在调查过程有重大疏漏,这一裁定可帮助进口商拿回多缴的惩罚性关税,同时将改变针对中国的贸易补偿行动。虽然中方这一胜利的意义略小于媒体以及中方律师强调的意义,但仍然是关键时刻取得的显著胜利。中国政府至今尚未在世贸组织取得可以和这一案件相媲美的成就。

        Restani法官的裁决并未禁止美国商务部针对中国及其他非市场经济体展开反补贴调查。事实上,这一案件的意义将主要表现在针对中国产品展开的反倾销调查中。Restani法官裁定:如果美国商务部决定针对面临反倾销调查、且美国商务部在计算反倾销税率时使用非市场经济体计算方法的中国产品展开反补贴调查时,美国商务部必须改变计算反倾销税率的方法以避免在反补贴调查中双重征税。她指出美国商务部应在反补贴法非市场经济体条款管辖范围内完成这一任务。她要求美国商务部找到解决这一问题的途径。

        对于美国商务而言,就如Restani法官建议,解决双重征税最简单的方法是重新采用二十多年来沿用的老方法:不向非市场经济体展开反补贴调查。她指出联邦法院上诉庭在1986年乔治城钢铁案中裁定美国商务部无需针对非市场经济体使用反补贴税。许多法律评论家将乔治城钢铁案解释为禁止向非市场经济体使用反补贴法。Restani法官提到这一解释,但是她认为乔治城钢铁案裁决在这一点上模棱两可,她自己也认为这一法律条文模棱两可。因此,她并不认为美国商务部的诠释“毫无依据”。

        Restani法官并未明确要求美国商务部放弃向非市场经济体采用反补贴法,而是给予美国商务部修改反倾销税率计算方法的选择以避免双重征税。目前美国商务部在针对中国展开的反补贴调查领域投入巨大政治资本,我们预计商务部会极具创意地、非常辛苦地寻找途径修改反倾销税率计算方法、以此解决这一法律挑战,而不必重新回到对乔治城钢铁案的传统解释

        美国商务部也可以将反倾销调查和反补贴调查分开处理。它可放弃针对同一产品同时展开反补贴和反倾销调查。这可能增加申诉方的费用,但同时申诉方也可以保留申请展开反补贴、反倾销调查的权利。或者,他们可选择将受指控的补贴排除在反倾销调查中的成本计算之外。这样,重复计算不存在,但是受指控的补贴项目仍将面临调查。

        Restani法官并没有排除这些可能性。恰恰相反,她明确允许“合理的”针对非市场经济国家的反补贴申诉书。她拒绝否决乔治城钢铁案,但是她否定了过去二十年里对这一案件最流行的理解。 

         Restani法官同时否决了美国商务部使用2000年12月11日——中国加入世贸组织这一天作为计算反补贴税率的起始日期。美国商务部对这一日期之后的补贴都展开调查并征收反补贴税率,但是拒绝调查这一日期前给予的补贴。一些中国企业提出美国商务部在1997年宣布将对中国使用反补贴法,因此此前的反补贴项目不必担心面临反补贴调查。但是美国生产商认为应该没有最早截止日期。Restani法官裁定美国商务部应根据每一反补贴指控的实际情况决定最早截止日期。这说明中国政府和中国企业现在应开始准备应对针对1990年代补贴项目的指控。对于代表中国参与反补贴应诉的律师来说,这是关于核心争端的严重倒退。

        作为美国国际贸易法庭的首席法官,Restani法官一直以来是一位严厉、思想深刻、愿意拒绝美国政府论点、准备从倾向自由贸易的角度诠释法律、国际协定的法官。但是从历史纪录来看,联邦上诉庭也曾驳回她的裁决。偶尔,当她认为一法律问题尤其重要、可能还颇有难度,她就与其他两位法官一起审理案件。三位法官的联合裁决在过去二十年里从未被驳回。所以,Restani法官的这一裁决可能面临上诉、且比较脆弱。

        在庆祝中国取得胜利之余,否决双重征税也带来其他许多问题使得中国取得的法律胜利显得并不辉煌。有关本案最关键的法律原则——是否可对非市场经济体展开反补贴调查,中国几乎全盘皆输,只有涉案美国进口商可拿回部分惩罚性关税,让同时递交反补贴、反倾销申诉的美国申诉方面临更多难题。虽然胜利并不显赫,但是这比在世贸组织取得的任何胜利都更具实际意义,而且比未来可能取的胜利更辉煌。 这一案件带来许多启示,其中之一就是美国法庭并非对中国上诉不友善。另一经验是,用中国典故; 路漫漫其修远兮,需要分步走。这一上诉是证明中国经济运作合理性的第一步,而不是最后一步。
 

(翻译:朱晶)