A Deep Freeze on Climate Change? 深度冷藏气候变化会谈?

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President Obama declared in his State of the Union address on January 27, to a standing ovation, that the United States would not take second place to anyone in the world, and specifically to countries such as China and India. The specific reference to China and India highlighted their growing importance on the global stage. India and China increasingly have been presenting a united front against the United States and the rest of the developed world, despite their own on-going political and territorial disputes (as we noted in our articles entitled, India, China, and the Doha Round, and India and China Turn Up the Heat on Climate Change).

We predicted in India and China Turn Up the Heat on Climate Change that an alliance between India and China could present a formidable barrier at the climate change meetings in Copenhagen in December 2009. Indeed, the talks have been regarded by many as a failure, and the resulting Accord as “low-ambition.” Just as India, with the support of China, had been blamed by the United States for the failure of the Doha Round in July 2008, China, with the support of India, has been blamed by many for the failure of Copenhagen.

The Copenhagen Accord, drafted by Brazil, China, India, South Africa (the “BASIC” countries) and the United States, is not legally binding, and was recognized but not approved by the 193 countries represented at Copenhagen. It seeks to limit a rise in temperatures to no more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and sets a goal that developed countries jointly will deliver $30 billion of aid over the next three years and $100 billion a year by 2020 to help developing countries cope with the impact of climate change.

Developing countries, including China and India, have made clear that they will join other countries to combat climate change, but not at the expense of their own economic interests. They conditioned acting on the receipt of significant concessions from the developed world, which they see as primarily responsible for the problem they are being asked to address.

Both China and India chose Copenhagen as the platform from which to demonstrate that they could not be bullied by the developed world. India’s Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh stated in an address following the meetings in Copenhagen that the alliance of BASIC countries highlighted the growing influence of emerging economies. He further characterized as a significant victory the commitment from developed countries to provide $100 billion/year in climate funding without having to make significant concessions in return. He indicated that close links with China would continue. China also declared that Copenhagen proved China could not be pushed around.

India has been concerned about the binding nature of the Copenhagen Accord. Even though India was among the countries that brokered the deal, sources have said that it announced its support for the Accord only after UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon clarified to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the Accord was a political statement of intent with no legal force. In the aftermath of the Copenhagen meetings, Minister Ramesh even “pled guilty” for allowing provision for “international consultation and analysis” of domestic mitigation programs, a greater concession than merely informing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) about domestic mitigation programs. When the environment ministers of the BASIC countries met on January 24, 2010, Minister Ramesh stated that the Copenhagen Accord has “no hope” of becoming a legally binding document.

The Copenhagen Accord did include a January 31, 2010 deadline for countries to outline their climate change plans and declare specific emission reduction targets. More than 50 countries respected the deadline, including India and China. India committed to reduce emissions by 20-25% by 2020 (in comparison to 2005 levels) through domestic mitigation efforts, but stated specifically that “its domestic mitigation actions will be entirely voluntary in nature and will not have a legally binding character.” India further stated that “mitigation actions will also not apply to agriculture sector. The emissions from agriculture sector will be excluded from the assessment of emissions intensity.”

China stated in a January 28 letter that it would endeavor to cut the amount of carbon produced per unit of economic output by 40 to 45 percent below projected growth levels by 2020, also from a 2005 base. However, given China’s projected rate of economic growth, China still would increase substantially its total carbon emissions while expecting the developed countries to decrease their emissions drastically.

Whether the Copenhagen meeting was successful cannot be determined strictly from the setting of targets, on the one hand, and the absence of any legally binding agreement, on the other. It may be that “success” will have to be measured by “progress,” with the standard for progress reasonably modest and determined by actual carbon emission reductions worldwide. Nonetheless, unmistakably there will be no global progress without the developing world. Copenhagen confirmed a China-India alliance as the base of a larger group of developing countries resistant to progress at their expense.

China, India, Brazil, and South Africa are now central to progress on climate change. They have asked the UNFCC to hold six meetings through 2010 in preparation for the next climate summit in Mexico City in December. The BASIC ministers themselves will meet once each quarter, first in Cape Town at the end of April 2010. The European Community had entered Copenhagen with even greater ambition than the United States. The BASIC countries proved that Europe, the United States, and other developed countries will make little or no progress without them.
 

        奥巴马总统在1月27日国情咨文演讲中宣布美国在世界事务中不会屈居第二,尤其不会落后于中国和印度。他在演讲中着重指出中国和印度说明这两个国家在世界事务中日益扮演更重要的角色。虽然中印间仍存在政治、领土纠纷,但是两国仍在美国及发达国家前组成共同阵营(见《印度、中国及多哈会谈》、《中印为气候变化加温》)。

        我们在《中印为气候变化加温》一文中预测中印联盟将成为2009年哥本哈根会谈的阻碍。不出所料,这一会谈被许多观察家视为失败,会谈签署的协议也被视为“缺少野心”。正如美国指控中国支持下的印度应为2008年7月多哈会谈失败负责,在哥本哈根会谈中受印度支持的中国面临同样的指责。

        巴西、中国、南非(“基础国家”)与美国联合起草的《哥本哈根协定》不具法律效力,这一协议虽为与会的193国认可,但却没有得到她们的批准。这一协定试图将升温限制在不高于工业化程度前全球气温2摄氏度的范围之内,还要求发达国家在未来三年内提供300亿美金的资金支持,并将每年提供一千亿美金的资金支持发展中国家应对气候变化带来的影响,直至2020年。

        包括中印在内的发展中国家明确表示她们将和其他国家一起应对气候变化,但决不会以牺牲她们的经济利益为代价。她们表示她们的行动将以发达国家的重大让步为基础,因为她们认为发达国家应对气候变暖负主要责任。

        中国和印度都选择哥本哈根作为显示她们不向发达国家屈服的战场。印度环境部长Jairam Ramesh 在会谈结束后的演讲中指出,基础国家联盟标志着发展中国家的影响力日益增强。他还指出发达国家承诺每年提供一千亿美金的资金支持、而发展中国家没有做出重大让步是发展中国家取得的重大胜利。他表示将继续和中国紧密合作。而中国也声称哥本哈根会谈证明中国不会为他国所左右。

        印度一直担心《哥本哈根协定》的法律效力。虽然印度是促成这一协定的国家之一,知情者指出印度直至联合国秘书长向印度总理澄清这一政治声明不具法律效力后,才宣布支持这一协定。在哥本哈根会谈后,印度总理因协议中有就国内减排措施进行“国际磋商和分析”这一条款而向公众“认罪”,因为这一条款比联合国气候变化框架公约有关条款做出更大让步。当基础国家的环境部长于2010年1月24日举行会谈时,Ramesh部长说这一协定“没有希望”成为具有法律效力的文件。

        《哥本哈根协定》设立了2010年1月31日这一最后截止日期让各国列出气候变化方案及减排目标。包括中印在内的50多个国家尊重这一截止日期。印度承诺通过国内减排措施,至2020年减排百分之20至25(与2005年排放量相比),但强调“她的国内减排措施建立在自愿原则上,不受法律效力限制”。印度进一步指出“减排措施不包括农业产业。农业领域的排放将排除在排放限量内”。

        中国在1月28日的信中承诺争取到2020年单位国内生产总值二氧化碳排放比2005年减排百分之40至45。但是根据中国的经济增长预测,中国将持续增加二氧化碳排放总量,但她同时却希望发达国家显著减少排放量。

        哥本哈根会谈成功与否既不能仅以设定目标为标准,也不能以缺少具有法律效力的文件为标志。“成功”或许应当以“进展”来衡量,而“进展”的衡量标准相对较低、且以全球范围内的实际减排量为标准。然而,没有发展中国家的努力不可能实现全球减排。哥本哈根会谈证明中印联盟是众多发展中国家拒绝以她们的牺牲为代价参与谈判的基础。

        中国、印度、巴西和南非是气候变化谈判进展的核心。她们要求联合国气候变化框架公约在2010年12月前举行六次会谈,为墨西哥峰会作准备。“基础国家”将每一季度会谈一次,第一次会谈将于4月在南非开普敦举行。欧盟在哥本哈根会谈前提出比美国更高的目标。但是“基础国家”证明没有这些发展中国家的支持,欧洲、美国和其他发达国家不可取得进展。
 

         “成功”或许应当以“进展”来衡量,而“进展”的衡量标准相对较低、且以全球范围内的实际减排量为标准。然而,没有发展中国家的努力不可能实现全球减排。哥本哈根会谈证明中印联盟是一大群发展中国家拒绝以她们的牺牲为代价的基础。

        中国、印度、巴西和南非是气候变化谈判进展的核心。她们要求联合国气候变化框架公约在2010年12月前举行六次会谈,为墨西哥峰会作准备。“基础国家”将每一季度会谈一次,第一次会谈将于4月在南非开普敦举行。欧盟在哥本哈根会谈前提出比美国更高的目标。但是“基础国家”证明没有这些发展中国家的支持,欧洲、美国和其他发达国家不可取得进展。

 (翻译:朱晶)

Steel Matters 举足轻重的钢铁工业

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Besides currency valuation, steel is perhaps the most contentious trade issue between China and the United States. Steel products face numerous traditional trade remedy actions in both countries, and are under intense scrutiny in the climate change debate. In the United States, Congress is considering whether to include in climate change legislation additional tariffs on imported steel and other energy-intensive products to offset alleged competitive harm to domestic industries, should other countries not commit to equivalent greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reductions.

China And Copenhagen
China’s chief climate negotiator, Vice Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) XIE Zhenhua, visited India at the end of October where he signed the Agreement on Cooperation on Addressing Climate Change. China and India together called on developed countries to take the lead in reducing GHG emissions and provide financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building support to developing countries.

It was not surprising for the world’s leading GHG emitter to form an alliance with India, another rising industrial power, on the eve of the Copenhagen meeting. Indeed, it was a victory for China to obtain India’s assurance that there “was virtually no difference between the negotiating positions” of the two Asian giants.

China slightly softened its stance in the final negotiations at the Copenhagen meeting, and signaled a willingness to abandon its demand for funding from the developed world. Meanwhile, China's State Council announced that China would stick to its promise to cut emissions per unit of GDP by 40 to 45 percent by 2020.

Although China thinks this promise to cut emissions is a large concession, it may not be viewed that way from the perspective of developed countries, or of those developing countries that are particularly at risk from climate change. With China’s economy expected to expand at a rate of 7 to 10 percent per year for the next decade, a 45 percent reduction per unit of GDP would mean that China’s GHG emissions would still rise substantially while China expects developed countries to make drastic reductions.

Climate Change And The Steel Industry
Even though China’s promise is not binding, Beijing is not paying mere lip-service to climate change. China has realized that it is in its interest to improve energy efficiency, particularly in the steel sector. Improved energy efficiency is the most cost effective way that China can lower its GHG emissions.

A case study of Hebei Province, China’s leading iron and steel producer (18 percent of the nation’s total iron and steel output in 2007), illustrates the benefit to China of improved energy efficiency, with reduced GHG emissions being a favorable side effect. The case study also demonstrates the difficulties Beijing faces in pushing local governments to shut down small and inefficient steel mills.

Low energy efficiency is one of the reasons why Hebei’s contribution to the nation’s economic growth lags behind coastal provinces. Gross industrial output created by Hebei’s large companies in 2007 was US$230.5 billion (RMB1,705.5 billion), accounting for 4.2 percent of China’s total; industrial value-added was US$65.2 billion (RMB482.3 billion), about 4.1 percent of the nation’s total. In contrast, the same indices for coastal Jiangsu Province, also a major steel producer, were roughly three times those of Hebei (13.2 percent and 11 percent respectively).

Increasing energy efficiency, and reducing GHG emissions, in Hebei’s steel industry depends upon closing old, inefficient mills. However, both the provincial government and the public are reluctant (or unable) to force the iron and steel industry to close those mills. Hebei Province relies heavily on energy intensive industries. It has attracted 112 of China’s Top-1000 energy consuming enterprises, with steel companies the most important. The industrial profit generated by the province’s large ferrous metal producers was US$6.8 billion (RMB50 billion) in 2007, 27.3 percent of the province’s total industrial profit produced by large companies in all industries. Steel employed in 2008 some 450,000 workers, 15 percent of the province’s total employment. As the unemployment rate is rising in Hebei, neither the provincial government nor the public wants to see those small inefficient steel mills closed.

So far, the province has taken one major step to improve the steel industry’s energy efficiency. It consolidated the province’s top two steel groups and launched the Hebei Iron & Steel Group (“HBIS”) in 2008, which became China’s number two steel producer. The creation of HBIS was to improve the competiveness and efficiency of Hebei’s steel industry. However, a recent Chinese study pointed out that China’s giant iron and steel producers are not necessarily more efficient than smaller companies. Compared to the size of a steel company, technology plays a more important role in improving efficiency, particularly energy efficiency.

As in the United States, steel is a major employer in China, and as in the United States, there is insufficient political will to sacrifice steel industry jobs on behalf of climate change. Industry consolidation is inevitable in China as it has been in the United States, but data do not support the perception that fewer, bigger steel mills must translate into reduced GHG emissions. It is not so much size as age that matters. Inefficiency may drive smaller, older mills out of business, but they are less likely to shutter because of a desire to clean up the environment.
 

        除人民币汇率这一议题之外,钢铁产品可能是中美两国间最备受争议的贸易议题了。钢铁产品不仅在中美两国都面临贸易救济行动,同时在气候变化谈判中也面临严峻考验。如果其他国家不愿相应减少温室气体排放,美国国会考虑将在气候变化法案中向出口至美国的钢铁等高能耗产品征收额外关税以确保本国企业竞争力。

中国和哥本哈根
         中国首席气候变化谈判代表——中国发展改革委员会副主任谢振华于2009年10月访问印度,并与印度官员签署了《关于应对气候变化合作的协定》。中印两国共同呼吁发达国家率先减少温室气体排放,并向发展中国家提供资金、技术转让和能力建设支持。

        作为世界最大的温室气体排放国,中国在哥本哈根会谈前夕与另一成长中的工业大国——印度达成这一协议并不令人惊讶。印度公开承诺两大亚洲巨人的“谈判立场基本没有差别”更是中国在外交领域取得的重大胜利。

         中国在哥本哈根会谈中稍稍缓和了其谈判立场,表示愿意放弃要求发达国家提供资金支持的要求。同时,中国国务院宣布中国将坚守至2020年,单位GDP减排百分之四十至百分之四十五的承诺。

          虽然中国认为这一承诺是巨大让步,但是发达国家和直接面临气候变化冲击的发展中国家却不这么认为。中国经济在未来十多年里仍将以百分之七至百分之十的速度增长,因此单位GDP减排百分之四十五意味着中国温室气体总体排放量仍将显著上升。同时中国却期待发达国家显著减少温室气体排放。


气候变化与钢铁工业
          虽然中国的承诺不具法律效应,但中国并非是行动的矮子。中国认识到提高能效符合自身利益,尤其有助于钢铁产业发展。对于中国而言,提高能效是减少温室气体排放的最佳途径。

          河北省是中国第一大钢铁生产省(2007年产量占全国钢铁产量的百分之十八)。河北省的个案研究可充分展示提高能效有益于中国发展,以及中央政府在促使地方政府关闭小型、低能效钢铁企业过程中面临的种种难题。

           低能效是河北对中国经济发展的贡献远远滞后于沿海省份的重要原因之一。2007年河北省大型企业的工业总产值为17055亿元(2305亿美金),占全国工业总产值的百分之4.2;工业增加值为4823亿元(652亿美金),占全国工业增加值的本分之4.1。然而,同为钢铁大省、沿海的江苏省的这两项指标却是河北省的三倍(分别占全国总量的百分之13.2和百分之11。)

         河北省若想提高能效、减少温室气体排放,很大程度上依赖于关闭落后、低能效钢铁企业。但是,省政府和公众都不愿意(或是无力)施压钢铁企业、关闭这些落后、低能效的钢铁厂。河北省经济极度依赖高能耗企业。中国千大高能耗企业中有112家企业位于河北省。其中钢铁企业扮演最重要角色。该省大型钢铁生产企业在2007年创造了价值500亿人民币的工业利润(68亿美金),占全省大型企业工业利润的百分之27.3。同时,2008年河北省钢铁企业职工总数达到45万人,占全省就业人口的百分之十五。当省内失业人口不断攀升,河北省政府和公众都不希望看到小型落后钢铁企业关闭、带来更多失业人口。

           迄今为止,省政府已经采取一项重要举措以提高钢铁企业能效。河北省两大钢铁集团于2008年合并创建了中国第二大钢铁生产企业——河北钢铁集团。这一合并旨在增进河北省钢铁企业的竞争力和能效。但是,中国最近发布的一份科研报告指出,中国的大型钢铁生产企业的效率并不一定比中小型企业高。与企业规模相比,技术是决定效率(尤其是能效)高低的关键。

        与美国的情况相似,中国钢铁企业通常是就业大户;同时中国和美国一样缺少足够政治意愿,愿意以牺牲就业机会为代价减缓气候变化。和美国的经历相似,企业整合是中国发展道路中不可避免的趋势。迄今还没有足够的数据支持企业整合可以减少温室气体排放这一观点。企业大小并非关键。低能效可把小型落后钢铁企业驱逐出市场,但是改进环保却不是关闭它们的理由。

 (作者兼译者:朱晶)