China-U.S. Trade Law : International Trade Lawyer & Attorney : Baker Hostetler Law Firm : Trade Remedies, Customs & Export Controls

A year ago, American sentiment toward China, at least as expressed by many Members of Congress, was decidedly negative. Pending legislation included denunciations of China’s subsidization of exports and currency manipulation. Some Members of Congress wanted to restrict all Chinese imports. The slow American economic recovery was blamed to a significant degree on China.

Now, with Americans more focused on domestic economic woes than on any other single concern, complaints about China have receded. Illegal immigrants in the United States seem more of a target than anyone outside the country, even though there is no evidence at all that they have contributed to unemployment or economic stagnation. Historically, Americans tend to blame foreigners for economic hardship and there is a spike in trade remedy actions against foreign products. Not this time. Neither China nor anyone else but Americans themselves (and perhaps the aliens within), especially congressional leaders, seem to be blamed.

Still, China remains an available target, or at least a convenient means for collateral attacks on other trade priorities. The Obama Administration recognizes three pending trade agreements, with Korea, Colombia, and Panama, as potential stimuli for an expansion of exports that would create jobs. After three years renegotiating them to satisfy moderate Democrats as well as trade unions, the Administration declared them ready for congressional passage many months ago. Republicans, claiming to be champions of free trade, zealously advocated for their immediate passage until the Administration was satisfied with them. Then, Republicans launched a political campaign to deny workers displaced by trade agreements the Trade Adjustment Assistance (“TAA”) that for many years had enjoyed bipartisan support because the Administration linked TAA to passage of the trade deals.

The Administration may have pacified Democrats with the renegotiations and persuaded them that the trade agreements would bolster the economy, but not enough to prevent the insinuation of China as a barrier to final congressional approval. House of Representatives Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) has demanded a House vote on a bill retaliating against alleged Chinese currency manipulation as a pre-condition for voting on the trade deals. Her gambit, moreover, seems to have some companion support on the other side of Capitol Hill, where a small group of Senators plans to introduce a similar bill to retaliate against alleged Chinese currency manipulation. No such bill currently is pending, and none was passed in the last year, but Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W. Va.) is proposing one, focused as much on a complaint about the WTO’s Appellate Body as on China.

With a crowded legislative agenda, bills on Chinese currency not yet fully conceptualized are not likely ever to become law. The very threat of them, however, could impede other international trade. The attempted linkage to the trade agreements with Korea, Colombia, and Panama is typical of congressional legislative tactics, but also a desperate sabotage of the Administration by its own political party.

The Administration wants and needs the trade deals. Republicans have wanted these trade deals, but have not wanted President Obama to enjoy the satisfaction and potential electoral help from passing them. The President could not pass them relying on his own party. At the moment when he seemed to have struck an agreement with Republicans to pass both TAA and the three free trade agreements, some Democrats seem to be seeking ways to stop him. Their general weapon of choice appears to be China, which Obama has not wanted to antagonize, and more specifically the currency, which his economists generally have advised not to pursue more than diplomacy has been pursuing already.

China, then, is no longer the principal target in bills about currency manipulation. In the Senate, the more fundamental complaint is about the WTO, and in the House the intended target is trade liberalization. In neither case is China likely to be used effectively, but it surely must be to China’s dismay that it is being used in these debates at all.

Other pending legislation regarding China arises more in the context of national security or simple nationalism: a resolution that would ban Chinese manufacture of parts for the President’s helicopter fleet; a ban on technology transfer from NASA. There is more than one “sense of” resolution, which has no legal consequence. Meanwhile, the Administration is promising China more from its export control reform than it can or will deliver, but at least it is actively gesturing in a desired direction.

Unlike a year ago, the legislative spotlight illuminating grievances over the economy and trade is not on China. Indeed, what some call the “Manchurian Candidate” for President, former Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, has suggested that the United States must look to itself before looking to China for explanations of economic difficulties. The current focus should not be misinterpreted: the bills about China are not about China.

There are many reasons why. The most important is domestic. The summer spectacle of eighty-seven congressional freshmen holding the country’s debt ceiling hostage concentrated minds at home. Imminent possible failure of European banks, and of whole countries, has shifted focus from east to west. Renewed Wall Street bonuses and continuing home foreclosures are reminders of domestic greed, not foreign malevolence. The national conversation is not about China.

There is also a powerful explanation in the deliberate foreign policy toward China of the Obama Administration. Much has been done to routinize U.S.-China diplomacy and reduce earlier tensions. Even as there have been few concrete accomplishments, there have been many calming meetings. The Strategic and Economic Dialogue convened successfully. A summit of Presidents in Washington in January helped Obama recover from his doubtful Asian outing last November, and squads of potential Chinese investors have been visiting the United States, nurturing hope that some of the massive foreign reserves accumulated by China may yet find their way back to the United States. Better in the form of investments than loans or purchased bonds. China, at least rhetorically, has recognized that it cannot continue to attract foreign investment without making some foreign investments of its own.

In November, while in Asia, Obama called for resumption of the Doha Round. His Administration now admits that this objective is not likely to be fulfilled. With its failure will be a failure to capitalize on the imagined global trading rewards that might have energized the world’s economy, and diminish even more the instruments thought to be available for economic recovery. In place of multilateralism, bilateralism is a modest but nonetheless significant alternative.

Successful partnership with China becomes more important with every multilateral setback. Diplomacy that routinizes the relationship, that removes it from a critical spotlight, inevitably makes the partnership more attractive to China. The trick, however, must be to avoid appearing weak, or desperate, to China. As much as the United States needs China, China needs the United States. As congressional complaint about China is not about China, friendship with China is not necessarily so much about China either. Both are about solving economic problems felt at home but driven by forces as foreign as domestic.

And so it is for China, too. China needs the United States as much for China as for the United States, for domestic as well as foreign purposes.

Changes in American politics about China from a year ago say more about the United States than about China or U.S.-China relations. It will be important for both countries to recognize and understand the impact of domestic politics on their relations, and on the needs they have for each other.

 

         一年前，美国明显对华不太友好，至少这是许多国会议员的态度。他们提交议案，指责中国对出口品提供不正当补贴以及操纵汇率。一些国会议员提议限制中国产品出口至美国。美国经济复苏缓慢也被认为是中国的错。

          当前，美国民众对国内经济发展的关注程度远远超过其他任何议题，对中国的抱怨声开始消退。虽然没有证据表明在美非法移民导致失业率居高不下或经济停滞，但他们却成为众矢之的，而境外目标开始退出美国公众视野。回顾历史，美国总爱把导致经济困难的责任推在外国人身上，针对外国产品的贸易补偿行动数不胜数。但这次却不同。中国及其他国家并未面临指责，但是美国人从自身查找原因，国会领导人首当其冲。

           但是中国仍可能成为被攻击对象，至少很容易成为其它贸易目标的附带牺牲品。奥巴马政府将尚待国会批准的与韩国、哥伦比亚以及巴拿马签订的双边贸易协定视为促进出口、增加就业的良方。奥巴马政府用了三年时间与三国重新谈判，以满足温和派民主党人以及工会的要求，并于数月前宣布谈判完毕、只待国会批准。然而自称倡导自由贸易的共和党人却坚持要求奥巴马政府满足他们的条件后才能通过这三个自由贸易协定。随后，共和党人又发起运动抵制向因受自由贸易协定冲击的失业工人提供贸易调整补助——这一补助多年来受到两党支持，但仅仅因为奥巴马政府将贸易调整补助和通过自由贸易协定联系在一起，共和党人就转变了立场。
 

           英文全文请点击这里

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Editor's Note:  Amelia Lo, the author of this article, is a Chinese law student in Hong Kong who was a foreign intern at Baker & Hostetler LLP during the summer, 2010.

According to United States Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), a strident critic of China’s currency policy, “[the] most important issue in the Chinese-American relationship is currency.”  Schumer and other American critics often have used the term “currency manipulation”, fraught with negative connotation, when referring to China’s currency policy.  To appreciate the perspectives of two distinct sides in this debate, it is probably better to find more neutral language.  Governments may control the value of their currency, whether through the money supply (the actions of the American Federal Reserve Bank) or by floating on world currency markets.  Consequently, reference to “currency control” instead of “currency manipulation” might facilitate a dialogue that, to date, has been confrontational and full of accusations.

An Overview
China pegs its currency to the U.S. dollar at about 6.827.  In May, 2010, the trade deficit between China and the US was “the largest imbalance with any country”.  In June, the US trade deficit had reached nearly $50 billion, the largest figure in two years.

During 2010, there have been a number of bilateral meetings between Premier Hu of China and President Obama of the United States.  On June 19th, China’s central bank announced that it would reform “the formation mechanism of the Yuan exchange rate to improve its flexibility”.  The United States interpreted this announcement as an important Chinese concession, and looked forward to a significant and rapid adjustment in the exchange rate between the yuan (or “renminbi”or “RMB”) and the dollar.  There may have been exaggerated expectations of instant and significant market changes following China’s announcement, but only two small adjustments have occurred since June 19 and it may be too early to evaluate China’s new exchange rate policy.

The U.S. Point Of View
There seems to be an American consensus that China is manipulating the exchange rate of its currency, preventing it from floating free on world markets, to gain a trade advantage for an export-led economy.  The mainstream American media project this view, consistent with frequent expressions of American politicians, that China is manipulating its currency by maintaining a very low value for the yuan in trading with the dollar and other currencies.  Some, like Rep. Sander M. Levin (D-Mich.), even blame the unemployment problem in the U.S, perhaps the leading issue in the midterm elections, on China’s currency policy.

Although President Obama and Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner have urged China “to allow the yuan to float higher,” they have been sensitive to potential Chinese reaction and value the U.S.-China relationship enough to avoid directly naming China as a currency manipulator in their annually mandated report to Congress.  They postponed delivery of the report until China had indicated some movement on the currency, enabling them to soften the criticism they otherwise were encountering.  They welcomed China’s June 19 announcement, but were concerned about how China’s promise to make its currency more flexible would affect U.S. China trade in practice. On 16 September, 2010, Secretary Geithner promised Congress that they, with other countries, will put pressure on China for “trade and currency reforms” in the next G20 summit in November in Seoul.

Although they have proposed different solutions to combat alleged currency manipulation, some more drastic than others, at least 130 US senators and representatives, Democrats and Republicans alike, disagree with China’s currency policy. Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), the ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, urged the Administration to name China as a currency manipulator.  Going a step further, Congressman Levin (D-Mich.), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, urged the Administration to monitor closely China’s progress and take appropriate action by filing a complaint against China at the WTO alleging violation of Article XV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

While Levin and Grassley, key Democratic and Republican members in Congress, agree that the Administration should do more to influence China to take more significant steps to appreciate its currency, Senator Schumer and Reps. Tim Ryan (D-Ohio) and Tim Murphy (R-Pa.) have sponsored bills in the Senate and the House, such as the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act 2010, intended to force the U.S. Commerce Department to obtain a trade remedy against China if its currency is undervalued.

Some American manufacturers argue that the Chinese yuan “is undervalued by as much as 40 percent” and that the undervaluation acts as an unfair subsidy to Chinese goods.  Scott Paul, the executive director of the Alliance for American Manufacturing, has called on Congress to pass “strong legislation to penalize China’s currency manipulation”, believing that such congressional action would decrease the U.S. trade deficit.  Another lobbying group, the Committee to Support U.S. Trade Laws, along with some 47 manufacturing groups and unions that make up the “Fair Currency Coalition”, support Senator Schumer’s legislative efforts to pass “an effective, WTO-consistent trade remedy without further delay.”

Despite the congressional pressures and pressure from American manufacturers, China is not without defenders in the United States.  The US-China Business Council and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce agree that the exchange rate is a serious problem, but both contend that legislation treating currency control as a subsidy subject to countervailing duties is not a good way to achieve the goal of rebalancing the yuan.  These associations think it wiser for the Administration to continue “its current approach of using multilateral and bilateral persuasion to achieve Chinese exchange rate reform” and to wait and observe the results.  The Commerce Department’s recent ruling in late August, 2010 that China’s yuan value cannot be “considered a direct subsidy to Chinese exporters” is a wise move as it avoided the direct confrontation of trade and currency issues.

China’s Point Of View
The Chinese Government strongly denies allegations of currency manipulation and rejects claims that the yuan is undervalued.  Premier Wen Jiaobao and the Chinese Foreign and Commerce Ministries are all of the view that China’s goal of a stable currency benefits the world at large, especially during the financial crisis.

Premier Wen maintains that China aims to continue to provide a stable currency and “steadily advance the reform of the formation mechanism of the RMB exchange rate under the principle of independent decision-making, controllability and gradual progress.”  Wen emphasizes that, while “some countries [are applying double standards when they demand the appreciation of the yuan] but at the same time [practice] trade protectionism against China,” China will continue in its goal to work towards trade balance, rather than surplus.

To illustrate the advantage of a stable yuan-dollar exchange, Wen refers to the popular view that “China’s efforts to maintain a stable yuan-dollar exchange rate [despite pressure to devalue] during the 1998 Asian financial crisis helped the world.”  China’s decision to keep its currency stable gave its currency credibility and ensured China’s financial stability after the crisis as “the nation [was able to] focus on improving productivity, quality and cutting costs.”

Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang thinks that the U.S. politicizes the currency issue too much, and in a destructive and negative way.  He argues that, contrary to what U.S. congressmen may expect, “the appreciation of the yuan will neither root out the U.S. trade deficit to China nor solve the low U.S. savings rate or unemployment” problems.  Members of the Commerce Ministry, including Commerce Minister Chen Deming, Vice Commerce Minister Zhong Shan, and Commerce Ministry Spokesman Yao Jian, have reiterated consistently that the U.S. trade deficit will not be solved by a change in China’s currency policy.  Yao ascribes reasons other than the currency policy, such as globalization, for China’s trade surplus.

According to Zhong, the U.S. China trade deficit “is caused by the shift in international division of labor and of industries against the backdrop of globalization.” This theory, he says, was demonstrated in March, when China’s trade surplus briefly fell into a trade deficit under a basically stable exchange rate.  While Yi Gang, head of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange and Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China, contended that an official timetable for currency reform was not viable due to unbalanced development in China, he emphasized that China’s major goal in exchange rate reform is to make the yuan a “convertible currency”, one that can flow freely.

According to China’s Yuan Stress Test in March 2010, “half of China’s textile firms may [go] bankrupt if the value of the [Yuan] rises 5 percent against the U.S. dollar, given the industry’s thin profit margins.”  Such job losses could affect as many as 20 million civilians directly engaged in the textile industry, and another 140 million working in cotton farming.  Such indicators lead Chinese authorities to insist that the yuan’s convertibility is an internal affair, and that China will not sacrifice its domestic interests under foreign pressure.

Selected Points Of View Of Scholars
There is a variety of views on this subject: while some support China, many are those who strongly believe that the yuan is undervalued.

Supporters of China’s currency policy include Nobel Prize Laureate Robert A. Mundell, “father” of the Euro.  He remarked in June 2010 that he did not think that China should have a large appreciation in the current situation and that too much appreciation would hurt China’s economy. Another Nobel Laureate, Joseph Stiglitz, contends that the “US’s [act of forcing] China to revalue the RMB is a manifestation of protectionism” and that “the United States putting pressure on China for Yuan appreciation is [not a good idea as it risks] shaking up the foundation of world economic recovery.”

Economist Bai Chong-en of Tsinghua University in Beijing thinks that the yuan is not seriously undervalued.  He further contends that outside pressure on China to reform its exchange rate may do more harm than good in convincing China to allow its currency to appreciate, as “people don’t like to be forced to change things.”  Xia Bin, economist and counselor of the State Council, asserts that the US deficit is caused by the “defective economic structure” of the US but not China’s yuan value.  Huang Yiping, a professor at Peking University, who considers himself  “a strong advocate of greater exchange rate flexibility in China”,disapproves of Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman’s advice to the US government to blame, finger point and confront China for global problems and job losses.

There are strongly-held, contrary views from other leading economists.  Krugman, Fred Bergsten, Director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, and Robert E. Scott , Senior Economist of the Economic Policy Institute, have repeatedly urged the U.S. government to adopt more aggressive policies such as ‘naming and shaming’ and retaliatory measures against China.  All three scholars blame China for US job losses, though the values they allege vary from about 1.5 million to 3 million. 

Krugman has accused China’s “undervalued” yuan of being a “significant drag on global economic recovery,” and has referred to China’s exchange rate policy as “most distortionary” and “[damaging]” and China’s manipulation to be “self-evident”.  To Krugman, and to Scott, the United States has the upper hand over Chinese exports and the U.S. government should not be afraid to force China into action on the currency.

Bergsten thinks the yuan is undervalued by between “[at least] 25 and 40 percent”.  He claims that China’s 2005 appreciation was not a real appreciation due to China’s increase in productivity. Although Bergsten acknowledges that macroeconomic forces contribute to China’s undervalued currency, he blames the Chinese government for manipulating its currency by “[buying] about $1 billion daily in the exchange markets to keep [its] currency from rising”, and claims these purchases to be the main cause of the exchange problem, in addition to a form of protectionism.

Would An Appreciation Of The Chinese Currency Actually Help The United States?
All things being equal, as economists like to say, an appreciation of the Chinese currency would make Chinese goods more expensive in the US and US goods cheaper in China.  Logically, an appreciation of the yuan therefore would decrease the US trade deficit with China, increase exports, and thus create jobs in the US.  China’s policy helps China in the long run.  But does it help China in the short run, as it may inhibit Chinese manufacturers’ desire to improve the quality of their products, such that they may have a quality advantage in addition to a cost advantage in the future?  Will other countries regard China as a market economy were it to adopt a fixed rather than floating rate?

Concluding Thoughts
The Peterson Institute for International Economics defines one of the criteria for “manipulation” to be “large intervention in one direction over a sustained period that frustrates balance of payments adjustments.”  If that definition were adopted generally, many countries in the world, including the U.S., could arguably fit the description of currency control or manipulation at first glance.  Liam Halligan, a UK-based economist and commentator, argues that “America’s long standing ‘weak dollar’ policy,” which “[allowed] its currency to depreciate in order to lower the value of its foreign debt,” “[amounted] to the biggest currency manipulation [and protectionism ] in human history.”

As Treasury Secretary Geithner wisely understands, the US cannot “force” China to revalue its currency in order “to create a level playing field for American exporters.”  Relentless pressure on China to revalue could harm the U.S. China relationship, which the Administration seems to value more than the narrower issue of currency exchange.  At the same time, the Chinese government should take into account the concerns of the US and conduct more dialogue with the US while it improves the flexibility of its currency.

According to Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Barry Bosworth, focusing exclusively on the exchange rate issue is “a mistake”.  The US government should focus on expanding US exports. Rather than blaming China for its economic problems, the US government should work within its own scope of influence, to formulate strategies that enhance the production capacity of manufacturers, to implement tax saving incentives to encourage employment and help small businesses.

We should not forget that US consumers have benefited from the diversity of low-cost Chinese imports.  If the US were to impose trade restrictions on China’s goods, US consumers would likely have fewer choices.

Time is required for an economy like China’s to transform from being export-oriented to market-based.  Both China and the U.S. are concerned about unemployment. On June 20th of this year, the Chinese government made a promise.  The U.S. should be patient and wait to see the results of China’s promise.  According to recent measurements, the value of the yuan “has risen about 1.5 percent, most of that over the course of [the week before the 15th of September]”, which is quite a promising figure.  Instead of striving for actions that involve blaming, shaming and retaliating, the U.S. government can initiate acts of cooperation, trust and tolerance such as by increasing dialogue at the top, the middle and grass root levels with China so that it can understand China’s plan and policy better, and allow China to understand American concerns.  By working together sincerely and communicating honestly and openly, the leaders of the two governments are likely to be able to reach a successful compromise and consensus on the currency issue.
 

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        Washington, D.C., partner Elliot Feldman, leader of Baker Hostetler's international trade practice and an author of the firm's China-U.S. Trade Law blog, authored a column, "China and the US Must Stop Throwing Stones," which was published in the "Opinion" section of the March 30, 2010, edition of the The Financial Times （中文全文请点击这里）.

        According to Feldman, "One of the most troubling features of the growing tension between China and the US is that both countries legitimately have a lot to complain about. It is commonly understood that China and the US have divergent interests. Less understood is that, in the bilateral economic and trade relationship, they usually are complaining about the same things. Both are trying to protect jobs and now seem engaged in a zero-sum game that no one can win. When China and the US criticise each other, each side must realise they are launching their complaints from inside glass houses without regard for their own structural vulnerabilities."

      Feldman continues: "Both China and the US believe the other is attempting to interfere in a free market economy and engage in protectionist practices to the detriment of the other. The US sees too much state direction in the Chinese economy and continues to designate China as a non-market economy, leaving China feeling stigmatised and at an unfair disadvantage in international trade."

        Feldman's article goes on to provide insight into the countries' opposing viewpoints and some of the events/actions which have led to the current situation. He concludes: "China and the US should acknowledge the reciprocal nature and legitimacy of each other's complaints and seek mutual solutions–or such complaints will compound and multiply, and the two countries will grow further apart and more antagonistic. If Beijing and Washington cannot agree to stop throwing stones from inside their glass houses, the great risk to the world is that they will board them up."

The full article, "China and the US Must Stop Throwing Stones," can be viewed on The Financial Times website (free registration required).

        中美间的紧张关系令人担忧，其中一个特点是两国合情合理都有许多可以抱怨的事件。公众都了解中美间存在利益分歧。但是不为人知的一点是，两国在国际贸易和经济领域抱怨相同的内容。两国都试图保护本国就业机会，但现在两国似乎处于零和游戏中，没有一方可以取得胜利。当中美互相指责对方时，他们应当意识到自己站在玻璃房子中向对方发起攻击、忽视自己处于结构性弱势。（美国有句俗语：住在玻璃屋中的人不向邻居扔石头。）

        中美两国都坚信对方试图影响自由市场经济并采取保护性行为使对方处于弱势。美国认为政府指令在中国经济发展中扮演过于重要的角色，因此仍视中国为非市场经济体，使中国感到自己在国际贸易中处于竞争劣势。

         美国认为中国经济是政府指令型经济。她认为中国的省及地方五年计划进一步强化了国家计划。国有企业在中国经济中占主导地位，尤其在钢铁、能源等最重要的经济领域。国有银行控制贷款。税收政策系统性地向某些产业倾斜。同时，向生产商提供能源的也是国有企业。在中国土地亦非私有。最重要的一点是人民币汇率紧跟美元，在国际市场上不能自由兑换。
 

        但中国却不这么认为。国有企业是把利润分配给所有持股人的企业，而这些持股人正是全体中国公民而非少数资本家。董事会掌控这些国有企业，而且这些企业旨在通过竞争获得利润。国家控制的银行旨在确保国家利益，因而避免冲动、不营利且甚至可能威胁国家经济发展的贷款。就业人口是流动的，而且面临竞争。中国认为所有中国公民都是中国经济的股东并不影响他们支持企业间自由竞争。政府发挥董事会的作用。许多观察家认为当前中国和传统资本主义国家一样崇尚金钱。

        从中国的角度来看，美国指责中国为“非市场经济体”或是贸易扭曲型经济是做一套、说一套的伪善表现。美国就像站在玻璃房子中对中国扔石头。2008年雷曼兄弟公司倒闭之后，美国联邦政府在几大银行中拥有很多股权。政府同时掌控了汽车行业。美国国会不断修改税法给予某些行业特别优惠，尤其是较依赖出口的行业。虽然财产私有，但是政府机构决定所有权条款并提供资金。同时美国政府定期干预经济以增加、保证就业机会，管理就业市场，鼓励企业增加就业机会、减少裁员。

        但当中国否认美国的不公平贸易指控时，中国也是从玻璃房子中向对方发起攻击。当中国在美国为自己的行动辩护时，她的行动加强、而非减弱否定其市场经济体地位的指控。中国非但没有表现自己对地方政府及其“计划”和商业行为没有控制，相反北京政府强调所有地方政府、都向其汇报。中国不愿承认在贸易调查中收集美国政府索取的信息有很大难度，但她递交的调查问卷答复却恰恰显示了这一点。北京政府非但没有让私营企业自主选聘律师、捍卫自身利益，反而组织、指挥理应独立的商会参与应诉法律工作。这些行动进一步强化了美国调查者心中中国经济是国有经济、不能被视为市场经济的印象。

       中美两国都不是理想的市场经济体。当130位美国众议员提议因就中国的汇率政策向中国产品征收百分之二十五的附加进口税时；当中国商务部部长警告美国国会行动将引发贸易战时，双方的行动都为世界繁荣带来巨大风险。

（翻译：朱晶）

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Members of the Baker Hostetler International Trade practice have been quoted in numerous media outlets regarding various Chinese -U.S. trade issues, including:

Wall Street Journal: China Firms Defend Tech-Purchase Rules (12/14/09)

Law360: Shoe On Other Foot As China Investigates U.S. Autos (12/10/09)

Financial Times: China to Investigate U.S. Car Subsidies (10/29/09)

International Trade Law360: Q&A with Elliot Feldman (10/6/09)

International Trade Law360: Mistakes To Avoid In Duties Cases (10/5/09)

China Daily - U.S. Edition: Trade Imbalance Teeters Amid Quarrels (9/28/09)

Bloomberg TV: The U.S.-China Relationship (9/24/09)

Financial Times: China Appeals on WTO Films Ruling (9/23/09)

Financial Times: US Car Aid Plan Irks Trading Partners (8/4/09)

BusinessWeek: The U.S. and China Put Their First String in Washington Summit (7/27/09)

Reuters: U.S. Lawmaker Blasts China Food Safety (3/18/09)

Whether "Buy American" Could Become "Bye America": Trade Protection in the Stimulus Package (2/5/09)

Bloomberg TV's "On the Economy": China Currency Controversy (1/23/09)

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